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THREE ESSAYS ON PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN URBAN INDIA 
(Order No. ) 
YOICHIRO KIMURA 
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2013 
Major Professor: Dilip Mookherjee, Professor of Economics 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies the effects of urban land deregulation in India between 1999-2007 
on access to credit, factor allocations and productivity of Indian firms . The deregulation 
repealed limitations on holdings and transfer of real estate property, potentially enhancing 
collateralizability of land and liquidity in the land market. The first chapter develops 
a theoretical model to predict the effects of the deregulation and clarify the channels of 
impact. The second chapter uses data for large and medium sized Indian firms from the 
PROWESS database to empirically examine the effect of the deregulation on the access 
of firms to credit. The third chapter uses the same dataset to examine effects on factor 
allocation within and across firms , and on firm as well as aggregate productivity. 
The first chapter provides a theoretical model of the deregulation and its effects on use of 
land as collateral. This is in a setting of competitive credit markets where loan contracts are 
subject to moral hazard. The model predicts that the deregulation expanded the collateral 
value of land and access to credit for medium-sized firms . On the other hand, the credit 
access could decline for small and large size firms owing to general equilibrium effects of the 
vii 
increased credit demand. The effects are predicted to vary with historical landholdings of 
firms. 
The second chapter uses the panel data set of Indian firms to test the theoretical predic-
tions of the first chapter. I find that the land deregulation led to greater land transactions 
overall. Moreover, the deregulation reallocated credit from landless, landed-small and large 
firms , to landed-medium firms in a manner consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
The third chapter uses the same data set to examine the effects of the deregulation on 
productivity and factor allocation across firms and industries of manufacturing sector. I find 
that firm productivity became more dispersed. Resources are reallocated from less to more 
productive firms . As a result , aggregate productivity of the treatment states increased as 
compared to that of the control states. Additional regression analyses suggest that market 
competition generated these differential effects on firm productivity. 
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Chapter 1 
Property Rights Improvement and 
Credit Reallocation in Urban 
India: Theory 
Abstract: This chapter theoretically studies the effect of land deregulation on credit access 
by Indian firms . I model the deregulation of holdings and transfers of land in the late-1990's 
India as a change in the transaction costs of land collateral in a contracting model of loans 
subject to moral hazard. The model predicts that the deregulation allows for an expansion 
of land collateralization and a larger leverage of land collateral; and that the net effects on 
firm borrowings are heterogeneous in firm size and landholdings. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Credit constraints faced by people in less developed economies are one of the crucial impedi-
ments to economic development, by hampering a process of capital and wealth accumulation 
both at micro and macro levels [Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), 
Galor and Zeira (1993)]. Evidence indicates that firms and small enterprises in less de-
veloped economies are severely credit-constrained, even if their marginal rate of return to 
capital is high [Banerjee and Dufl.o (2008), de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)]. Al-
though asymmetric information in credit markets is the fundamental source of the credit 
constraints, insecure property rights worsens the credit constraints as they limit the bor-
rowers' ability to pledge against default with collateral, as emphasized by DeSoto (2000). 1 
Interplay between asymmetric information in the credit markets and insecure property rights 
particularly harm the poor households and firms in these economies who need collateral to 
access external financing. Programs of property-rights titling and property reforms are, 
therefore, expected to improve credit access by raising the ability to collateralize assets, 
paving a way toward a sustainable economic development. 
In this chapter, I theoretically study the impacts on borrowers' credit access of the 
property-rights improvement, made possible by an Indian land deregulation, with an em-
phasis on the distributional consequences. I develop a model of loan contract with moral 
hazard and costly land transactions. To guide my distributional argument that follows , 
I take into account heterogeneous effects on credit demand by borrowers , and the po-
tential general-equilibrium effects arising from an increased aggregate demand for credit. 
1 Malfunctioning financial institutions are other sources of credit constraints , as they restrict one's ability 
to utilize a full capacity to relax the constraint. Judicial reforms in India to more efficiently process the 
disputes over debt recovery and collateral seizure are studied by von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria 
(forthcoming) , Vig (2011) and Visaria (2009) . 
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In the next chapter, I will empirically test the theoretical predictions of this chapter by 
using a quasi-experimental repeal of the urban land ceilings and regulation (henceforth, 
simply "land regulation"), which was implemented in more than 60 of the largest Indian 
cities/urban agglomerations in 1999, and a panel dataset of Indian firms. In particular, 
I assess whether the property-rights improvement results in an average increase in credit 
access, or in a reallocation of credit across borrowers. 
For more than 20 years in the late 20th century, Indian firms and households in major 
large cities have experienced an artificial restriction of property rights of land and buildings. 
Until it was repealed in 1999, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, enacted by the 
parliament of India in 1976, provided ceiling limits in holdings of vacant land, prohibited 
transfers of land and buildings, and restricted building construction in 64 of the largest 
urban agglomerations, limiting the owners' exclusive rights to use and transfer the real 
estate assets. In practice, the limited rights of use and transfers of land effectively restricted 
land transactions. Hence, the deregulation made it possible for land to be transferred (to 
creditors or purchasers) , thus allowing for a greater use of land as collateral for loans. In 
1999, the Repeal Act gave rights to repeal the regulation to state governments of India, 
providing a variation in status and timing of the land deregulation across states and years. 
By 2003, all the union territories (including Delhi) and the states of Gujarat, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjub, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, have repealed 
the regulation, while the states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar , Maharashtra, and West 
Bengal, kept it effective until 2008. 
Property-rights improvement changes the incentives of the treated people, as widely 
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discussed in the literature. 2 I argue in this chapter that in the case of credit access, 
property-rights improvement induces more land collateralizations and more frequent land 
transactions, and that the credit impacts are largely driven by these behavioral responses. 
In particular , I theoretically argue how the borrowers' strategies of land collateralization, 
with or without the regulation, creates heterogeneous treatment effects of the property-
rights improvement. My model incorporates a borrower's choice of the degree of asset 
collateralizations as part of the repayment schedule. Comparative statics show how the 
collateralization strategy of the borrower changes as the land rights improve. I show that 
under land regulation, a borrower will rationally choose not to provide land collateral when 
the investment size exceeds a certain level, and, that as a result , medium-sized firms do not 
collateralize land under land regulation, resulting in a severe credit-rationing for these firms. 
Repeal of the land regulation induces these medium-sized firms to utilize a full capacity of 
land collateral, allowing them to experience a substantial increase in their ability to pledge 
against default . I call this expansion of the land collateralization the "extensive margin of 
the deregulation effect" . 
The degree to which a firm is affected by a property-rights improvement is governed by 
a mixture of the extensive, as well as intensive, margins of the effect, which are, in turn, 
determined by their landholdings and the size of the collateralizable assets, and the potential 
general-equilibrium effects. First , by focusing on the partial-equilibrium impacts where the 
return to be offered to lenders is given , the model predicts that there are three kinds of 
firms with qualitatively heterogeneous treatment effects, based on the decomposition of 
2 Existing literature consistently finds that more secure property rights cause higher income per-capita 
[Acemoglu , Johnson and Robinson (2001)], induce more investment [Besley (1995) , Goldstein and Udry 
(2008), Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010), Hornbeck (2010), Johnson , McMillan and Woodruff (2002)], and 
reallocate resources to more productive use [Field (2007), Wang (2011 ), Wang (forthcoming)] . See Besley 
and Ghatak (2010) for the extensive review of the literature. 
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the treatment effect into the extensive and intensive margins: (1) medium-sized firms that 
experience both the extensive and intensive margins of the effects, (2) landed-small firms 
that experience only the intensive margin of the effects, and (3) landless firms that are not 
affected at all, which are essentially the same as large firms that can attain the first-best 
contract even under land regulation. 
In addition to the partial-equilibrium impacts, negative general-equilibrium effects may 
arise to the extent that the increased aggregate demand for credit improves the lenders ' 
opportunity cost of credit. Our model allows for an increase in the lenders ' outside option 
in response to the increased credit demand in order to show that net effects can be negative 
for landless , landed-small, and/ or large firms, since the direct effects for them are so small 
that the general-equilibrium effects are likely to dominate the direct effects. The model 
also predicts that the large general-equilibrium effects can kill the average increase in credit 
demand, leaving the net effect to be a reallocation of credit among borrowers. 
This chapter, combined with the results of the next chapter , contributes to a recent 
literature of estimating the effect of improving property rights on credit access. A body of 
reaserch finds little evidence of an increase in the average credit access when land rights 
improve. Field and Torero (2006) find that the Peruvian program of land titling did not 
increase the access to credit from private banks, while it increased the access to credit from 
the public banks. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find that the Argentinian program of 
land titling during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a only modest increase in mortgage 
loans , but not in the other forms of loans. Wang (forthcoming) finds that the Chinese 
housing reform allowed households to finance their entrepreneural activities by capitalizing 
on the value of the housing properties that they had rented from the state but purchased 
6 
at subsidized prices. This chapter provides an explanation to the evidence of the previ-
ous studies by going one step further to consider heterogeneous treatment effects and the 
general-equilibrium effects. 
This chapter is not the first to consider the distributional consequences of a particular 
source of financial development. Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (forthcoming) consider the 
distributional effect of the property rights improvement in a theoretical setting, stressing 
the role of the competition among lenders. 3 von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria 
(forthcoming) investigate the distributional effect of institutionally improving creditor rights 
to recover their credit, stressing the lenders' outside option, the point I take up in this 
chapter.4 This chapter thus joins these papers, by addressing that the land deregulation 
may not result in financial development in average terms, while it reallocates credit among 
borrowers. 
The following sections are organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulation and 
deregulation of urban land of India in the last 40 years. Section 3 introduces the model 
and analyzes how the repeal of the land ceilings and regulation affects a loan contract. It 
also derives empirically relevant equations from the comparative statics of the deregulation. 
Section 4 concludes. 
3They suggest that the effects are non-linear and heterogeneous by borrowers' wealth, consistent with 
my results. They also suggest that without a sufficient degree of lender competition, all the benefits of the 
improved property rights accrue to the lenders, instead of to the borrowers, which is again consistent with 
my results. 
4 They find, similar to my results, that the credit is progressively reallocated from the small firms to the 
large firms. Together with von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2010) , they stress the importance of the 
general-equilibrium effect of a policy. The point of their argument is that an institutional change aiming at 
expanding the set of contracts that debtors can access could change the relative position of creditors in a 
contract . 
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1. 2 Urban Land Regulation and Deregulation 1n India 
In this section, I discuss unique experiences of urban India in the last 35 years. The central 
government and the parliament of India set the regulation of land and buildings in 1976 
by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Although it was aimed to provide equal 
opportunities for all urban individuals , firms and any other sort of organizations, or for the 
poor in particular, it was widely recognized in the 1990's that the Act did not work the way 
in which it was designed. In 1999, the Act was repealed by India's Parliament. 
1.2.1 The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 
The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, known as the ULCRA, was enacted by 
India's Parliament on Feburary 17, 1976. The ULCRA had been at work in 64 urban 
agglomerations, each of which consisted of the central city and its surrounding suburban 
areas.5 It had three distinct dimensions of regulation: landholdings, real estate market 
transactions, and building construction. It not only set the ceiling limits on both ownership 
and possession of land,6 but it also prohibited transfers of land and buildings among indi-
viduals and firms, and restricted the construction of buildings in the urban agglomerations. 
In the following subsections, I argue how each dimension of the regulation had created the 
transaction costs in the land market and the investment in buildings. 
64 urban agglomerations from all across India, having at least 2 hundred thousand peo-
ple, were chosen to be given the ceiling limits in landholdings, which were calculated based 
on the population size in the 1971 Census. Those urban agglomerations were decomposed 
5 T he ULCRA made clear that the law does not apply to any governmental bodies including the govern-
ment companies , as well as any banks d efined in Banking Regulation Act of 1949. 
6 Land on which buildings were constructed before the implementation of the ULCRA were not subject 
to the ceilings. The fact that possession of land of the size greater than the ceiling limits is restricted means 
that the leased land is also subject to the regulation. 
8 
into four groups based on their population size in the year 1971, among which the three 
largest urban agglomerations (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, henceforth called "A-cities") had 
the severest ceiling limit at 500m2 per person. 7 The next 5 largest cities (Hyderabad, 
Ahmadabad, Bangalore, Kanpur, and Pune, henceforth called "B-cities") had the second 
severest ceiling limit at 1000m2 per person. Depending on the population size in the 1971 
Census, all the other urban agglomerations were classified to the groups with the ceiling 
limits of either 1500m2 or 2000m2 (henceforth , "C-cities" or "D-eit ies", respectively) . Table 
3.2 illustrates the classification of the 61 urban agglomerations to four categories based on 
the population size in the 1971 Census , as well as on the status of t he ULCRA at t he end 
of the sample period, which is the year 2007. No household or firm was allowed to own 
and possess land of a greater size than the ceiling limits . Excess land beyond the ceilings 
was in many cases, acquired by the state governments in return for a small amount of com-
pensation, which could not exceed 2 thousand Indian Rupees, a value equivalent to 47 US 
Dollars.89 
The Act also prohibited transfers of land and buildings, irrespective of whether a person 
holds land in excess of the ceiling limit. For any form of transfer of land and buildings, land 
traders must submit a notification of the trade to the state governments, and obtain an ap-
proval for the transactions. However , if the transfer of land and/ or buildings was processed 
7 The state of Tamil Nadu did not adopt t he ULCRA, but enacted similar law called the Tamil Nadu 
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act , 1978. It was effective until it was repealed in June 16, 1999. 
For this Act , the ceiling for industrial undertakings in the biggest cities was 2000m2 , the next biggset cities 
for 3000m 2 and the smallest cities for 4000m 2 . For other legal persons, the biggest cities h ave a limit of 
500m2 , the next biggest cities havel500m2 and the smallest citeis h ave 2000m2 T hus , the ceiling system 
was different from the ULCRA. We, therefore, exclude the state of Tamil Nadu from the empirical analysis 
as including it might confound the t reatment effect of repealing t he ULCRA. Tamil Nadu has three cit ies 
designated in t he ULCRA: Chennai as a A-city, and Madurai and Coimbatore as B-cities. 
8 0ne Indian Rupee was equivalent to 0.0235 U.S. Dollars on March 31st in 1999. Exchange rate has not 
changed since then up until 2011. 
9 In many other cases, disputes over the ownership of excess vacant land were brought to t he special court, 
called the Urban Land Tribunals. 
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by way of sale, rather than mortgage, gift, or lease, and if the state government decided not 
to approve the transaction, then the state government was authorized to acquire the urban 
properties for a payment calculated from the standards set in the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894, which was usually quite small. This part of the Act effectively made potential land 
sellers unwilling to participate in the land transaction for fear of their land being expro-
priated without any reasonable basis. Since it is , in general, necessary for both productive 
and unproductive firms to adjust their land holdings, either by selling or buying, in the 
process of business expansion, this Act did harm to firms in need of the asset adjustment 
and/ or capital investment. Even if the expansion was not necessary, land consolidation 
may have been required to be more efficient in production. Prohibition of transfer of land 
and buildings restricted all these kinds of opportunities that the firms may have wanted to 
exploit. 
This Act also regulated the construction of buildings. First, the ceiling limits were 
introduced for the areas of buildings if the buildings included a dwelling unit. Unlike the 
landholdings, the ceiling limits in the areas of buildings construction were given to two 
broadly defined groups of 64 urban agglomerations. One for the union of the A- and the 
B-cities was 300m2 and the other for the union of the C- and D-eities was 500m2 . It is worth 
noting that the ceiling limits were applicable only to construction of buildings with dwelling 
units . Secondly, no matter whether a building had a dwelling unit , the building constructed 
after the implementation of the ULCRA could be ordered to be either partially or entirely 
demolished by the state government for the sake of the public. Although much depended on 
the arbitrary nature of decisions made by the state governments, this part of the regulation 
made the land-holders unwilling to invest much in the building construction. It could have, 
10 
in turn, hindered the demand for land, as acquiring new land did not allow the firm to 
expand the business too much. Thus, it is implied that firms that were land-constrained 
were also constrained in terms of the building investment. 
Although ownership and possession of land as well as transfers of land and buildings 
were prohibited in general, the state governments allowed certain exceptions to be granted. 
Nonetheless, the criteria for grant exemptions were not so clearly nor sufficiently given in 
the Act that a huge degree of discretion was given to the state governments, and hence 
the granting decisions were quite arbitrarily made. This arbitrary nature of the exemption 
provision created severe confusion and hesitation in firms ' (and households') decision to 
participate in the land market transactions. 
1.2.2 Institutional Background and Repeal of the ULCRA 
The motivation behind the implementation of the ULCRA was the idea that it would be 
good to achieve a more equal land distribution in urban areas of India. The first paragraph 
of the Act briefly but concisely summarizes the aim of the Act: 
An Act [ ... ] provide[s] for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land [ . .. ], for the 
acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit , to regulate the construction 
of buildings on such land [ ... ] , with a view to preventing the concentration of 
urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein 
and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban 
agglomerations to subserve the common good. 10 
10Parts of the paragraph are omitted by the author. 
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The States of Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Gujarat , Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Ma-
harashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal and all the union 
territories initially adopted the Act. Subsequently in the same year, it was adopted by six 
more states, namely Assam, Bihar , Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya and Rajasthan. 
As a result , the ULCRA came into force in 17 states and three union territories until it was 
repealed by the federal government in 1999. 
Although the ULCRA was aimed at preventing concentration of urban land in hands of 
a few households and firms and to ensure an equitable distribution of urban land, hurdles 
to achieve the desired outcomes were soon realized, and the land acquisition for the public 
use through the ULCRA could not be achieved on account of numerous litigations. 
The Government finally decided to repeal the Act, and the Urban Land (Ceiling and 
Regulation) Repeal Act became effective on January 11th of 1999 when the ordinance of this 
Act was notified, after the state governments of Haryana and Punjab passed a resolution 
for repeal of the Act. Initially the Repeal Act was applicable in Haryana, Punjab and all 
the union territories. Subsequently, the Repeal Act was adopted by the state governments 
of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Orissa over the 
period from 2000 through 2003. It was only in the fiscal year 2007-2008 that, among the 
other non-repealing states, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra followed suit in the adoption 
of the Repeal Act. 11 The state governments of Assam, Bihar and West Bengal have not 
adopted the Repeal Act, 1999, as of today. 
11 Repeal of the ULCRA became mandatory in the federal policy agenda, called the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission (J NNURM) , initiated in 2005. A grant was also provided for the state 
governments once they repealed the ULCRA under the J NNURM. 
12 
1.3 Theoretical Analysis of Land Deregulation 
I consider a model of loan contract with moral hazard, by borrowing a model in von 
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria (forthcoming), and allow for a distortion in the real 
estate market . Firms maximize profits by investing in a project that potentially generate 
positive returns, but do not necessarily hold enough wealth to self-finance the investment. 
Thus, the firms need to turn to outside investors to finance the investment. Credit market 
imperfection, however, does not allow all the firms to obtain enough external funds , unless 
they guarantee loans by collateral of physical assets that can also be used in production, in 
order to raise their pledgeability. I assume that the asset collateral is composed of real es-
tate (that is, land and building, but henceforth I call it "land") and/ or plant and machinery 
(henceforth , simply"machines" ). My aim in this theory section is to see what happens in 
the credit market when the government-imposed regulation in the land market is repealed. 
To do so, I first consider the case where there is no land regulation. Next, I examine the case 
where there is land regulation, and hence liquidity of land is so low that the collateral value 
of land is low, which then hampers the pledgeability of firms that put up land collateral. 
1.3.1 Model Setup 
Timing of events is as follows . First, the loan contract, which specifies the loan size x 
and repayment schedule, is agreed upon by a risk-neutral firm and a risk-neutral lender. 
The firm then uses the funds raised from the outside lender in production. After the 
production has taken place, there occurs either one of two states of nature. The project 
financed by the outside investor succeeds with probability p and returns q(x) , and in the 
other state, the project fails with probability 1 - p and returns nothing. This uncertainty 
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is purely idiosyncratic in that any behavior by the firm cannot change its likelihood. 12 For 
the tractability of the model, I assume that the q(-) function is twice-differentiable, and 
satisfies the following properties: q' ( 0) = oo and q' ( oo) > 0, implying that regardless of 
the marginal cost of investment, it is optimal to invest in a positive value. After profits 
are made in each state, firms have two options, either making a repayment or reneging the 
contract. When the loan contract is honored, repayment ~ is made in each state, i = s or 
f. When a firm chooses to renege the loan contract, they will enjoy returns from investment , 
q(x ), while they lose the reputational value of d, which is the short-hand of the future profit 
stream they can get, had they not reneged the contract. Since the outcome of the project is 
assumed to be publicly observable and verifiable by a third party, the case in which the firm 
does not repay can be brought to the court by which all productive assets are potentially 
ordered to be legally seized. 13 I allow for repayment to take a form of either cash payment 
or collateral provision, or both. Since I assume, for simplicity, that firms do not hold cash 
to begin with, cash repayment comes only from returns from investment, which occurs only 
in the success state. 14 
12Therefore, I abstract from the ex-ante moral hazard. Uncertainty in the model is interpreted as an 
ideosyncratic shock to the Hicks-neutral technology parameter. Thus, the uncertainty for one firm is not 
correlated with that for another firm. Each contract is agreed upon separately by the bundle of a firm and a 
lender. In other words, there is no macroeconomic component in this uncertainty that is shared by a ll firms 
in the economy, in which case the outside investors need to insure against the systemic risk where all the 
firms are hit by a negative shock. We abstract from this kind of situation. 
13We implicitly assume that the legal enforcement is so strong that bringing the disputed case into the 
court will work effectively as the punishment device. It is also known that the legal process in debt recovery 
takes quite a long time in the courts (See for example, Visaria (2009) and von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee 
and Visaria (forthcoming)). We could a lso interpret this case as the restriction of the reneging firm to use 
the assets productively. To the extent that the long duration of the court process keeps the firms from fully 
exploiting the productive capacity, disputing in the court could work as the punishment device. 
14 1t is easy to incorporate cash holding in the model, but it does not generate meaningful implications 
of the model. More importantly, I theoretically abstract from the risk management of firms . In a dynamic 
setup of the decision making of a firm 's credit access and investment, the foreclosure of productive assets 
in the failure state would make it hard for it to operate in the following periods. Taking this fact into 
account , the firm would keep a portion of cash holdings or profit retention in case of the project 's failure. 
This sort of risk management is decided in conjunction with a potential reduction in the investment size x . 
Justification for the fact that I do not examine the risk management comes from my another assumption 
14 
Although firms have incentives to acquire assets to increase the capital stock to expand 
the productive capacity and obtain larger profits, they may not be able to do so when 
there is a possibility that firms divert to the private benefit , a portion of returns from 
investment without making a repayment prescribed in the contract. Therefore, the optimal 
contract agreed upon by the lender must induce firms not to divert the return, and to honor 
the contract by making the repayment. Such incentive-compatibility constraints are taken 
into account for each state in the contract. In the success state, the firm 's profits, net of 
repayment obligation, must be larger than, or equal to, the diverted profits, net of loss in 
assets legally seized by the court as well as the reputational costs.15 
q(x) - R s 2:: q(x ) - (M + L ) - d, (ICs) 
where R s is the repayment in the case of the project 's success, M and L are machines and 
land, respectively, and their sum is the value of the firm's total productive assets, and dis 
the repuational costs of the firms when they renege on the contract. In the failure state, on 
the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint is such that the firm 's loss caused by 
the repayment must be less than the loss in assets seized in the court and in reputation. 
-R1 2:: -(M + L ) - d, 
where R1 is the repayment by the firm in the case of the project's failure . Note that in this 
state, the project does not generate profits so the repayment comes only from collateral. 
Finally, the optimal contract must provide the outside investor at least as much as he 
that the borrower firms a re risk neutral . 
15 ln this model, I assume that when they renege the contract, the firm can divert the entire profits from 
the project while the entire assets are stripped by the court. 
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can get outside the particular contract. 16 Reward to the investor is the expected repayment 
from the firm , and the outside opportunity is the principal as well as the interest of the 
loan, x. 
R = pRs + (1- p)RJ 2:: (1 + 1r)x, (IR) 
where R is the expected repayment from the borrower firm, and 1r is the lenders' opportunity 
cost of credit (or, the interest rate). 
1.3.2 First- and Second-Best Contract without Land Regulation 
Let us suppose there is no urban land regulation, so that the asset markets are perfect. The 
first-best contract without the land regulation will be that the firm maximizes the output 
by choosing the investment scale x at a constant cost of credit of 1 + 1r , that is, it maximizes 
pq(x)- (1 + 1r)x, (1.1) 
giving us the first-order condition for all firms , pq' ( xF B) = 1 + 1r at the optimal level of 
investment x = xF B ( 1r). Note that an increase in the outside interest rate for the investor, 
1r, decreases the first-best level of investment . 
When a firm does not attain the first-best contract due to the moral hazard, the firm 
has to secure the loans by asset collaterals. The optimal contract for the firm maximizes 
the profits 
pq(x)- [PRs + (1- p)RJ J, (1.2) 
with the loan size x , the incentive constraints in (ICs) and (I CJ) and the participation 
161 implicitly assume here that the matching of a borrower and a lender in the credit market is in favor of 
lenders: that is, borrowers compete for lenders. More general implications of the general-equilibrium effects 
of a particular contract for competition for matching is studied by von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2010). 
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constraint in (IR). It turns out that in an economy without land regulation, maxrmum 
repayment is achieved in each state when all the collateralizable assets , M + L, are pledged, 
whereas the reputation of the borrower raises the borrower's pledgeability only in the success 
state simply because her limited liquidity does not allow her to repay more than the asset 
value, M + L , in the failure state. Combined with (IR), all the constraints are jointly 
expressed, but with the restriction that each costraint needs be satisfied, as 
(1.3) 
and the loan demand by a firm with assets (M, L) becomes 
(1.4) 
where W ( = M + L ) is the collateralizable assets. It implies that the loan demand is 
increasing in the size of firm 's collateralizable assets, and decreasing in the lender 's outside 
interest rate 1r. Note that in the case without land regulation , the way a firm makes a 
repayment to the lender does not matter. That is, to the extent that land is as liquid as 
machines , the composition of asset collateral does not affect the size of obtainable loans. 
This does not hold when there is transaction costs of land. 
1.3.3 Transaction Costs in Land Market and Potential Distortion 
Now I introduce into the model the land regulation that generates the t ransaction cost in 
the land market. Firms incur the transaction cost when they either sell or buy land in the 
market. Liquidation of land will return only t ( < 1) fraction of the internal value for the 
firm. Acquisition of land will cost 1/ t (> 1) fraction of the internal value. 1 - t fraction of 
the land value will be lost during the transaction. Now that there are transaction costs in 
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the land market, it becomes crucial for the firm to consider the way it makes a repayment. 
Since the lender requires the firm to cover the potential transaction costs, there will be a 
gap between the loss in value that the firm has to give up when they repay by liquidating 
land, and the actual repayment received by the lender. Loss in the firm's value due to 
repayment in the success and failure states then become Rf = r~ (q(x) + M) + r~Ljt , 
and Rf = rj M + r~L j t, respectively. rF E [0, 1] and ri E [0, t] are the fractions of 
values of liquid assets and illiquid land to be promised to the lender as collateral in state i, 
respectively. Notice that the upper bound of ri is t , since the rest of the value is lost during 
the process of the transaction. Note also that since I assume that machines are fully liquid, 
machines are treated here as if they are cash. On the other hand, the investor receives 
R s = r~ (q(x) + M) + r~L , and RJ = rjM + r~L in each state. The difference between 
R[ and ~ is the value to be lost during the transactions of land, and to be covered by the 
borrower. 17 Because borrowers are covering the transaction costs, the repayment coming 
from asset values does not depend on how it is financed. That is, the asset liquidation is 
equivalent to the asset collateralization. 
Now that the collateral composition has a first-order significance to the loan size andre-
payment incentives, the contract also specifies the firm 's collateralization strategy, ( r~ , r~ , rj , r~) , 
besides the triple of size and repayment schedule (x, R 8 , RJ ). 
Incentive constraints are modified so that the land transaction costs are reflected. Given 
the expression for the repayment in success and failure states, Rf, Rf , it becomes 
(ICF} 
17Here again, superiority of lenders in the bargaining position plays a role in making the borrower cover 
the costs. 
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and 
rl 
M + L + d > rmf M + _l_ L. 
- t (IC}) 
Lender's individual rationality constraint, (IR), is modified to incorporate the firm's collat-
eralization strategy, but the lender expects to be repaid the value, net of the land transaction 
cost. 
Optimal loan contract under the land regulation maximizes the borrower's profits 
( 
pr~ + (1 - p )r1 ) p(1-r~)q(x)- {pr~+(1-p)rj}M+ t 1L +M+L+d, (1.5) 
subject to the constraints (IC'[), (ICj), and (JRT). 
1.3.4 First- and Second-Best Contract under Land Regulation 
The first-best contracts in a credit market with costly land transactions are same as the 
first-best contracts in markets without transaction costs. AB in the previous subsection, 
we have pq'(xFB) = 1 + 1r as the first-order condition for the first-best contract, from the 
optimization of ( 1.1). 
By contrast, the optimal contracts under the land regulation are different from the 
optimal contracts without the land regulation. Presence of land transaction costs distorts 
the collateral provision of borrowers, which substantially reduces the borrowers ' ability to 
pledge against default. In the following, I discuss how borrowers rationally opt out to 
effectively use land as collateral. 
Under the optimal contracts, land is not seized in the event of project 's success. The 
return from the project are mainly used to repay the debt and int erest , since it is profitable 
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for every firms to repay first with liquid assets (cash and machines collateral) , and secondly 
with illiquid assets (land) . Since land seizure occurs only after all the return from the project 
is already pledged for repayment , the contracts that requires land seizure do not increase 
firm 's profits. It rather reduces the profits due to the transaction costs. This situation can 
be avoided by not agreeing upon the contract that requires land to be seized in the project's 
success. No land is, therefore, seized as collateral in the event of the project's success on 
the equilibrium path. Next lemma summarizes this. 
Lemma 1.1 Under the optimal contract, liquid assets are first collateralized, and illiquid 
land is collateralized only after the liquid assets are used up for repayment. Furthermore, 
land is not indeed liquidated to repay when the project is successful; that is, r; = 0. 
Proof. Proof is in the Appendix. • 
The IC constraints are binding in the success state under the optimal contracts, hence 
the asset collateral and reputation effectively boosts up the borrowers' pledgeability in this 
state. Intuition behind this result is the fact that for firms that cannot attain the first-best 
loan contract, the marginal return from investment is strictly higher than the marginal cost 
of capital, as long as liquid assets are used for repayment . In this state, firms repay up 
to the point where the repayment equals the collateral value of machines and land , plus 
reputation. Although land is not seized on the equilibrium path, land works effectively as 
collateral. On the other hand, t he IC constraints do not bind in the failure state. Due to 
the limited liquidity on hand in t his state, no firms can exploit the full capacity of collateral 
plus reputation. Firms repay up to the point where marginal cost of liquidating assets is 
equal to, or at least as low as , the marginal return from the investment. Marginal cost of 
asset liquidation varies across firms, depending on the liquidity of assets that t he firms use 
as collateral at margin. Unlike the success state, there will be some firms that use illiquid 
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assets as collateral for repayment in this state, which generates heterogeneous strategies of 
asset collateralization. Formal theoretical argument is provided in the next lemma and its 
proof in the Appendix. 
Lemma 1.2 Under the optimal contract, the incentive compatibility constraint in the suc-
cess state, (IC8 ) , is binding. 
Proof. Proof is in the Appendix. • 
Now with this lemma, the loan contract problem becomes much simplier expressed. By 
substituting the binding (IC8 ) constraint for the term r~{M + q(x)}, the optimal contract 
maximizes the borrower's profits 
pq( x) + (1 - p) (M + L + d) - (I - p) { rf M + r: L} (1.6) 
by choosing x, rj , and r~ , subject to (ICJ) and 
(IR*) 
Combined with the binding (IC8 ) constraint, (I R) constraint becomes (I R*) in which the 
investment scale is now only a function of repayment rates in the failure state. Objective 
function becomes simpler in that the repayment in the event of the project 's success does 
not involve the investment scale explicitly. Therefore, an increase in the investment scale 
leads to an increase in profits, while the investment scale is limited by the repayment ability 
(hence pledgeability) of the borrower , which is then dependent upon the firm 's strategies of 
land collateralization ( rj , r~). 
Up to this point , there is no heterogeneity across borrowers in terms of their pledgeability 
beyond the collateralization capacity determined by the total asset size. Once the asset 
seizure in the failure state is taken into account, there appear heterogeneous collateralization 
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strategies of borrowers in the failure state. First , for firms with a relatively small scale of 
project, land is seized in the failure state because the marginal return from an additional 
investments exceeds the marginal cost of land liquidation. Hence, these firms are willing to 
collateralize land in the failure state. Land collateralization occurs only when the project 
scale is small enough to expect high marginal returns from project, which can offset the 
deadweight loss due to the land liquidation in the failure state. These firms exploit full 
capacity of asset collateral to boost up the pledgeability in both states of nature. Second, 
for firms investing in a relatively large scale of project , land is not seized in the failure state 
because the marginal returns from an additional investment is smaller than the marginal cost 
of land liquidation. Hence, these firms do not pledge land as collateral in the failure state. 
By so doing, they avoid incurring the transaction costs arising from liquidating land in the 
market . For this type of firms, land collateral plays a role in boosting up t he pledgeability 
only in the success state. This partial collateralization of land substantially reduces their 
ability to pledge in accessing external funds , resulting in a severe credit-rationing. Next 
proposition summarizes the heterogeneous liquidation strategies based on the investment 
scale that firms can choose. 
Lemma 1.3 There is a unique investment level x (t, n) (< xFB) such that tpq' (x(t, n)) = 
1 + n, and that 
1. for all x < x(t, n), (rj, r~) = (1, t) , and 
2. for all x > x(t, n) , (rj , r~) = (1 , 0) . 
Proof. Proof is in the Appendix. • 
What differentiates the size of project and loans are the size of total collateralizable 
assets and the land share of those assets. Large firms, defined as firms that have large 
collateralizable assets , can borrow a lot by pledging a lot of assets as collateral , while 
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small firms borrow less since they have little to pledge as collateral. There is a threshold 
level of loans and project, above which land is not collateralized, while below which land 
is collateralized. If the land share of assets is large, even large firms end up with the 
threshold level of investment since they do not collateralize land. On the other hand, if 
the land share of assets is large, small firms can reach the threshold level of investment by 
collateralizing their land. As a result, there is a pool of loan contracts, in which the loan 
size and the state-contingent repayments are same but the rate of land collateralization 
varies across borrowers, depending on their total collateralizable assets and the land share 
of those assets. 18 The next proposition summarizes the loan demand as a function of the 
firm size and the land share in total assets, given the market prevailing interest rates and 
the degree of land transaction costs. 
Proposition 1.1 (Loan contract under the regulation) Under the optimal contract, 
the loan demand is a non-convex function of the land share in collateralizable assets, w, the 
total collateralizable assets, W and the lender's interest rate 1r. More specifically, 
if WE [wFB (w; n) , oo) , 
X= 
ltn + 1-i~-:)wW, if WE [inf W+(w; n, t), WFB(w; n)), 
x(t,n), if WE [supW- (w;K,t),infW+(w;n,t)), 
(1.7) 
..1!!!:_ + 1-(1-p)(l-t)wur 'j w [0 w-e t)) l+n l+'IT' vv, z E ,sup w;1r, . 
Proof. Proof is in the Appendix. • 
Solid black line with two kinks in Figure 1·2 illustrates the loan demand as a function 
of the total collateralizable assets, given the land share in assets. A pooling of contracts 
are illustrated as the fiat line, over which the rate of land collateralization decreases as the 
firm size (size of total collateralizable assets), W, increases. Smaller firms than those that 
18In lemma 5 of the Appendix of this chapter, I formally prove that there exists a pool of loan contracts 
for a certain range of fum size . I also prove that loan contracts are still unique to a certain size of the fum 
with a given land share. 
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can reach the threshold level of investment at x(t, 1r) use all the land as collateral, while 
larger firms do not use land as collateral. Thus, the demand curve is steeper for a lower 
scale of investment than for a higher scale. An increase in the collateralizable assets for a 
given land share results in a sharper rise in the loan demand for a low-scale investment than 
for a high-scale investment. This contrast is entirely driven by the fact that land is fully 
collateralized for the low-scale investment, while it only partially plays a role of collateral 
for the high-scale investment. Solid red line with only one kink in Figure 1·2 illustrates 
the loan demand for firms that have no land. Small firms are credit-rationed because they 
have little to pledge against default. Overall, the shape of Figure 1·2 illustrates how landed 
medium-sized firms experience a severe credit-rationing due to the fact that land does not 
effectively work as collateral in the failure state. From now, I call firms that obtain a smaller 
loan than the threshold level the small firms , firms that can obtain loans greater than the 
threshold but smaller than the first-best level the medium-sized firms, and firms that can 
attain the first-best loan contracts the large firms. 
1.3.5 Comparative Statics of Repealing the Land Regulation 
Now that the optimal contract is specified, I examine the comparative statics of repealing 
the land regulation . First I consider the case where the land regulation is repealed so 
that the land transaction costs are removed, but the impact appears only locally without 
generating an indirect effect through an increase in the market-prevailing interest rates. 
More precisely, I examine what the optimal contract would look like when the liquidation 
cost is repealed, namely as t --+ 1, without any effect on the interest rate 7r. Lastly, I 
examine the case where the general-equilibrium effect is at play through the change in the 
price of credit , 7r. 
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When the land regulation and the transaction cost are repealed, it increases the firm's 
demand for credit through two distinct channels: extensive and intensive margins. The 
extensive margin of the deregulation increases the collateralization rate of land for the firms 
that only partially use land collateral under the regulation. Only the firms with relatively 
small scale of investment fully utilize land collateral even under the land regulation and will 
not enjoy the extensive margin of the deregulation. For the firms with an investment scale 
greater than or equal to the threshold level, the post-deregulation collateralization rate of 
land increases as the transaction cost decreases (as t increases) . When it is completely 
repealed, these firms start to put up land in full as collateral in the failure state. The 
intensive Margin of the deregulation equally affects all firms that have land, by increasing 
the collateral value of a unit of land. Although the collateral of a unit of land with an 
internal value of 1 to a borrower firm only has a value oft to the outside lender under the 
regulation, the external value of the collateral improves as the transaction cost decreases 
(as t increases). The next proposition summarizes these effects. 
Proposition 1.2 (Extensive and Intensive Margins of Deregulation) When the land 
regulation is repealed, and hence the land transaction costs are removed (t-+ 1), all landed 
firms gain from the intensive margin, while only landed medium-sized firms gain from the 
extensive margin as well. More precisely, 
1. (Extensive Margin) The threshold level of investment, below which firms fully collat-
eralize land, increases for a given level of n: ax(t, n)jot > 0. Moreover, it reaches 
the first-best level of loans when the transaction costs are fully removed (lim x( t, 1r) = 
t-tl 
XFB ) . 
2. (Intensive Margin) The collateral value of a unit of land improves. 
Proof. Proof is in the Appendix. • 
There are three groups of firms in the economy, based on the heterogeneous direct 
treatment effect of the land deregulation. The first group, which I call the landed medium-
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sized firms, gains the most from the land deregulation, both from intensive as well as 
extensive margins. The second group, which are landed-small firms, gains from the intensive 
margin. Firms that have land but are too small in size to gain the extensive margin, will 
fall into this category. The last group, which are landless firms or firms that can attain the 
first-best contracts under the land regulation, gains nothing. Firms in this group are not 
directly affected by land deregulation. 
Now, given this proposition, however , an increase in the aggregate demand for credit 
could raise the interest rates of the lenders. As intensively discussed in von Lilienfeld-Toal, 
Mookherjee and Visaria (forthcoming) , the elasticity of the credit supply will play a key 
role in determining the equilibrium level of outstanding debt and the interest rates. To 
the extent that the supply is elastic with respect to the interest rates, an increase in the 
aggregate demand results in an increase in the equilibrium outstanding debt . If the supply 
is inelastic, the increased demand is suppressed by the increased interest rates to meet 
the supply. Since any general-equilibrium effect of this sort affects all the firms equally 
negatively, there will be firms that are indeed worse off as a result of land deregulation. 
Those that do not gain from the direct effect can be worse off. 
Proposition 1.3 (Comparative Statics with General-Equilibrium Effects) Given the 
extensive and intensive margins of the land deregulation, an increase in the interest rates 
caused by the inelastic supply of credit (1r -+ 1r1) will make some firms worse off. That is, 
1. for landless firms that borrow against machine collateral and reputation, there is no 
direct effect and the net effect will be negative; 
2. for large firms that can attain the first-best contracts under the land regulation, there 
is no direct effect and the net effect will be negative; and 
3. for landed-small firms, the direct effect comes from the intensive margin, but the net 
effect can be negative, depending on the degree of the general-equilibrium effect. 
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Notice that the general-equilibrium effect in this proposition will not create heterogeneity 
in the treatment effects. It is generated by the direct effect through the extensive margin 
of the deregulation, as discussed above. The general-equilibrium effect makes the net effect 
negative for some firms, implying that there will be a reallocation of credit among firms in a 
particular direction. Proposition 1. 3 suggests that the specified types of firms were protected 
in terms of credit access by the land regulation, although they are not necessarily the most 
productive users of credit in the economy. Credit allocation under the regulation, therefore, 
can be viewed as inefficient as compared to credit allocation without the regulation. 
Depending on the presence and degree of the general-equilibrium effects of the land 
deregulation, therefore, there will be a distinct theoretical prediction for credit access of the 
affected firms: a credit growth or a credit reallocation. First, credit access should increase, 
on average, if the credit supply is elastic with respect to interest rates. There is no negative 
general-equilibrium effects that contract credit demand. The degree of the treatment effects 
is heterogeneous across borrowers: landed-medium firms should gain the most . Second, if 
the credit supply is not elastic enough, credit access does not increase on average, and it 
is reallocated among borrowers. The direction of a reallocation is from landless, landed-
small and/or large firms to landed-medium firms. Which of the two outcomes will appear 
depends on the elasticity of credit supply that was not affected by the land deregulation in 
itself. Next proposition summarizes the theoretical predictions of the deregulation effect on 
borrowings, net of potential general-equilibrium effects. 
Proposition 1.4 Depending on the elasticity of credit supply, either of the following will 
occur. 
1. if credit supply is elastic with respect to interest rates, there will be a credit growth on 
average; largest gains accrue to landed-medium firms; landed-small firms will gain a 
little, whereas landless and large firms will not be affected, or 
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2. if credit supply is not elastic enough, there will be a credit reallocation among borrow-
ers; landed-medium firms increase borrowings, while landless, landed-small, and large 
firms reduce borrowings. 
In the following empirical sections, I empirically investigate which of a credit reallocation 
or a credit growth appears as a result of the land deregulation in urban India. Moreover, 
I also investigate and directly test the potential heterogeneity in treatment effects. Before 
doing so, the next section introduces the institutional background of land (de)regulation in 
India. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the qualitative effects of repealing the land ceilings and regulations 
that had restricted the land transactions in urban area of India for at least a quarter of 
century. The key contribution of the paper is to provide theoretical models that explain the 
fact that the landless, and landed-small and large firms all reduced their borrowing backed 
by collateral, while the landed medium-sized firms increased their secured borrowings after 
land deregulation. 
A theoretical mechanism explaining this result relies on firm heterogeneity: the extensive 
margin of the deregulation induces firms that opted out of the land collateral under the 
regulation to rely on land collateral, while the intensive margin of the effects raises the 
collateral value of a unit of land. General equilibrium effects appear if the supply of credit 
is elastic with respect to interest rates, so that deregulation directly increases the aggregate 
demand for credit. Net effect of the deregulation may make landless, landed-small and 
large firms worse off, while conferring significant benefits on landed medium-sized firms. 
To the extent that the theoretical predictions of this chapter is correct, we should observe 
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heterogeneous effect of the land deregulation among borrowers in the data. This empirical 
analysis is left to the next chapter. 
Whether the resulting credit allocation improved efficiency at the aggregate level is 
left unanswered. We theoretically find that the firms that benefited the most from the land 
deregulation are particularly credit-constrained due to the inability of land collateralization. 
However , it does not necessarily mean that they are the most productive users of credit. To 
fully address the issue of efficiency in credit allocation, we need to connect credit market 
outcomes with productivity, which requires a more detailed analysis of production. Since 
land regulation directly influences the asset management and capital accumulation of firms , 
firm production is, in itself, directly affected by the land deregulation. These lines of 
research are being examined in my ongoing work. 
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LA Appendix: Proofs 
Lemma 1 Under the optimal contract, liquid assets are first collateralized, and illiquid land is collateralized 
only after the liquid assets are used up for repayment. Furthermore, land is not indeed liquidated to repay 
when the project is successful; that is, r~ = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 1. We show this claim in steps: (1) (r;', r~) C 8:: {(m, l)im = 1, l E [0, 1]}U {(m, l)ll = 
0, m E [0, 1)}, (2) r~ = 0 if r;' = 1 under the optimal contract. 
• 
(1) Suppose otherwise that (r;' , r~) C 3:: {(m,l)lm E [0, 1), l E [0, 1]} \ 8 , where 8:: {(m, l)lm = 1, l E 
[0, 1]} U {(m, l) ll = 0, mE [0, 1]}. Now consider, for a given x, to raiser;' by d€ and to decrease r~ by 
{M + q(x)}d€/L so that the left-hand side of (IR) is kept constant. There must be a small value of 
d€ (> 0) that allows this manipulation at any point in 3. This is feasible in (JC,) as the right-hand 
side changes by 
{M ( )}d {M + q(x)}dE t- 1 {M ( )}d + q X € - = -- + q X € 1 t t (1.8) 
which is strictly negative for t being less than one. Similarly, the change in profits is 
p{M + q(x)}d€ 1- t 
-p{M + q(x)}d€ + t = -t-p{M + q(x)}dc, (1.9) 
which is strictly positive for a given x. Thus, it contradicts to the fact that the contract is optimal. 
The process continues either until r;' hits the upper bound that is one, or until r~ hits the lower 
bound that is zero. 
(2) Without loss of generality, it suffices, from the previous claim, to show that r~ = 0 if r;' = 1. Now 
let 's suppose otherwise that r~ > 0 (and r;' = 1) . Consider to lower r~ by dE, which is feasible in (IR) 
and (JC.). It is feasible in (IR) because when r;' = 1, the (IR) condition is slack at any x < xFB 
since pq(x) > (1 + :rr)x (Otherwise, no firm will start a project.) . The decrease in r~ will raise profits 
by tLdE/ t , which is strictly positive. Thus, decreasing r~ is feasibly profitable, contradicting to the 
fact that the contract is optimal . 
It indicates that when the project is successful, liquid assets and cash are first used for repayment, while 
illiquid land is liquidated only when all the liquid assets are used up for the repayment. This liquidation 
strategy of borrower firms is quite intuitive since the land liquidation involves the deadweight loss that is 
paid by the borrower firm but can not be recovered. Firm's liquidation starategy reflects their incentives to 
avoid the dead weight loss due to the land liquidation. This lemma further states that the land liquidation 
will never occur in the case of the project 's success. Since all the reward from the project is already pledged 
for repayment when illiquid land is collateralized, it is not only that an increase in the project scale caused 
by an incremental land liquidation will not increase the firm's profits , but an additional land liquidation 
indeed causes a loss in profits due to the deadweight loss. Therefore, land liquidation will not occur in the 
event of the project 's success under the optimal loan contract . 
Next lemma shows that under the optimal contract, higher repayment rate (r;') and/ or higher scale of 
investment (x) are chosen so that the incentive compatibility constraint (ICs) binds. Raising the repayment 
rate is profitable since even though it directly reduces the firm 's profits, it increases the investment scale that 
would bring about higher enough profits to compensate the loss in profits. This result is obtained from the 
fact that over the entire range of the second-best scales of investment, returns from investment are strictly 
higher than the cost of capital, that is eq' (x) > 1 + 1r for all x < xF B Therefore, as long as investment scale 
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is increased enough, decreasing the repayment, which accompanies a reduction in the investment scale, is 
profitable. As a result , the incentive compatibility constraint (IC,) is binding under the optimal contract. 
Lemma 2 Under the optimal contract, the incentive compatibility constraint in the success state, (IC,) , is 
binding. 
Proof of Lemma 2. When the (IC.) condition is not binding, it implies that there is room for the 
investment scale x to increase profitably. We consider to raise x in the following two cases: (1) when the 
repayment rater;' is large relative to the investment scale x (pr;'q'(x) < 1 + 1r) , (2) when the repayment 
rater;' is small relative to the investment scale x (pr;'q'(x) < 1 + 1r). 
• 
( 1) (pr ;' q' ( x) > 1 + 1r) Incrementally raising an investment scale does not affect the participation con-
straint in (I RT), while it raises profits and makes (IC'[) binding. Since this sort of profitable operation 
is feasible , the slack (IC'[) contradicts to the fact that the contract is optimal. 
(2) (pr;'q'(x) < 1 + 1r) Suppose that (IC'[) is not binding. Consider to raiser;' by df-L , and also raise x. 
(IR) requires that an increase in x should be less than a certain level, 
d < p{M + q(x)}df-L 
x- (1 + 1r)- prr;'q'(x)' (1.10) 
which is positive. There must be df-L close to zero so that increases in both df-L and dx is feasible in 
(I C s). Change in profits is 
~Profits -e{A + q(x)}df-L + e(1- r;')q'(x)dx 
e{A + q(x)}dJ-L [ eq'(x)- er;'q'(x) - 1] , 
(1 + 1r)- er';'q'(x) 
which is strictly positive, regardless of the value and sign of er;'q'(x) , since eq'(x) > 1 + 1r for all 
x < xFB . Therefore, raising x and r;' is feasibly profitable. Contradiction . 
Now with this lemma, the loan contract problem becomes much simplier expressed. By substituting the 
binding (ICs) constraint for the term r ;'{M + q(x)}, the optimal contract maximizes the borrower's profits 
pq(x) + (1- p)(M + L +d)- (1- p) {rf' M + r: L} (1.11) 
by choosing x , r f', and r~, subject to (ICj) and 
(IR*) 
Combined with the binding (IC,) constraint, (IR) constraint becomes (IR") in which the investment scale 
is now only a function of repayment rates in the failure state. Objective function becomes simpler in that the 
repayment in the event of the project 's success does not involve the investment scale explicitly. Therefore, 
an increase in the investment scale leads to an increase in profits, while the investment scale is limited 
by the repayment ability (hence pledgeability) of the borrower, which is then dependent upon the firm 's 
strategies of land collateralization (rf', r~ ). Next proposition summarizes the liquidation strategies based 
on the investment scale. 
Lemma 3 There is a unique investment level x(t , 1r) (< xFB) such that tpq' (x(t, 1r)) = 1 + 1r, and that 
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1. for all x < x(t,n), (rj,r~) = (1, t), and 
2. for all X> x(t,n), (rj,r~) = (1,0). 
Proof of Lemma 3. Proof proceeds in steps: (1) (rj,r~) C 8 =: {(m,l)lm = 1,l E [0, 1]} U {(m,l)ll = 
0, m E [0, 1]}, (2) rj = 1 under the optimal contract, and (3) r~ = t for x < x and r~ = 0 for x > x under 
the optimal contract. 
(1) Suppose otherwise that under the optimal contract, (rj,rj) C 3 =: {(m,l)lm E [0, 1J,l E [0, 1]} \8, 
where 8 = {(m, l) lm = 1, l E [0, 1]} U {(m, l) ll = 0, mE [0, 1]}, and consider to raise rj by dE and to 
decrease r~ by M dE/ L so that the left-hand side of (J R*) is kept constant. There must exist a small 
dE close to zero that allows this operation at any points in 3. This operation is feasible in (JCJ) since 
the change in the right-hand side is 
MdE- MdE = t- 1 MdE 
t t , (1.12) 
which is strictly negative as t < 1. Change in profits is 
1- t 
-t-(1- p)MdE, (1.13) 
which is strictly positive. Thus, raising rj while decreasing r~ is profitable, contradicting the fact 
that the contract is optimal. 
(2) Suppose otherwise that rj < 1 under the optimal contract. From the previous claim, it implies that 
rj = 0. Therefore, the (ICJ) constraint is not binding. Consider to raise rj by dE, which is feasible 
in (JC'[). From (IR*), the change in x should satisfy (1- p)MdE::;:: (1 + 1r)dx , which implies 
dx S (1 - p)M dE. 
(1 + n) 
From (1.11), the change in profits is therefore 
.6.Profits pq'(x)dx- (1- p)MdE 
:<:; (~q~~ - 1) (1- p)MdE, 
(1.14) 
which is strictly positive since pq'(x) > 1 + 1r for all x < xFB Therefore, increasing rj and x up to 
the point where (1.14) is satisfied is feasible and profitable, contradicting the fact that the contract 
is optimal. 
(3) We prove the last part separately, namely (a) rj = t for x < x(t, 1r), and (b) rj = 0 for x > x(t , 1r). 
(a) Suppose otherwise that rj < t (and rj = 1), and consider to raise r} by dE. Since (I CJ) is 
non-binding , it is feasible in (ICj) . Change in x must satisfy (1 - p)LdE 2: (1 + 1r)dx so that 
(I R*) holds. Therefore, the change in x is 
dx <_ (1 - p)L dE 
1 + 7f , (1.15) 
which is strictly positive. Now the change in profits is , from (1.11), 
L\Profits pq'(x)dx- (1- p)!:_dE 
t 
:<:; (~q~~ - ~)(1- p)LdE, 
• 
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which is positive when tpq'(x) > 1 + 1r, that is, when x < x(t,1r) where tpq'(x) = 1 + 1r. 
Therefore, for the range of x < x(t, 1r) , increasing rj is feasible and profitable . Contradiction. 
(b) Suppose otherwise that rj > 0 (and rj = 1) , and consider to decrease r} by dE . This is feasible 
in (ICj). Change in x must satisfy - (1- e)GdE ~ (1 + 1r)dx so that (IR* ) holds. Therefore, 
the change in x is 
dx ~ (1-p)LdE 
1 + 7r ' (1.16) 
which is strictly negative. Now the change in profits is, from (1.11), 
.6.Profits pq'(x)dx + (1- p)~dE 
~ (~-~q~~)(1-p)LdE, 
which is positive when 1 + 1r > tpq'(x), that is, when x > x(t,1r) where tpq'(x) = 1 + 1r. 
Therefore, for the range of x > x(t, 1r), increasing rj is feasible and profitable. Contradiction . 
Implication of this claim is first that firms investing in a relatively large scale of the project do not 
collateralize land to repay in any state. Therefore, they don't incur the transaction costs arising from the 
land collateral. These firms don't collateralize land in the failure state because it is costly to provide land 
collateral, relative to the gains from investment. Combined with Lemma 1.1 , these firms never rely on the 
land collateral in either state. It substantially reduces the pledgeability that the firms can exploit to access 
to external finance . Secondly, firms with a relat ively small scale of the investment are willing to collateralize 
land in the state of the project 's failure. Land collateralization occurs only when the project scale is small 
enough to expect high marginal returns from the project in the success state, which can offset the deadweight 
loss due to the land liquidation in the failure state. Land collateral plays only partially a role of boosting 
up the pledgeability because even these firms do not collateralize land in the success state. 
Proof of Proposition 1. In Lemma 4, I show that there is a unique level of the collateralizable assets 
that allows firms to attain the first best investment scale for each land share in the assets. I d efine W 
( = M + L ) as the total collateralizable assets. I also denote w as the land share of the firm , which is defined 
as w = M / W . Given the previous lemmas that identified t he unique repayment schedule under the optimal 
contract for any level of the investment except for the threshold level x, in Lemma 5, I prove that there 
exists a function of the firm size and the lans share to the threshold size of loans for a pool of contracts, and 
that t he optimal contract is still unique for each level of the total assets. 
Lemma 4 For a given level of 1r and the land share w , there exists a unique level of the total collateralizable 
assets WFB (w; ?T) = (1 + 1r)xFB / {1- (1 - p)w} such that 
1. for all w:::: wFB(w; ?T), FE level of investment is attainable (x = XFB ) , 
2. for all W < WFB(w ;1r) , {IR) (and hence {IR*)) binds. 
Proof of Lemma 4. First part of the proof is straightforward from the previous result. For all x > x(t; 1r) , 
the collateralization rates are (rj , r}) = (1 , 0) from Proposition 1. So, (J R*) implies that (1 - (1 - p)w) W ~ 
x(1 + 1r) . XFB (> x(t; 1r)) satisfies this inequality so long as W is greater than WFB (w; 1r) =: XFB (1 + 
1r) j (1 - (1- p)w). 
For the second part, suppose not (i.e. (IR*) is non-binding under the optimal contract). Then increasing 
x by a small dE is feasible in (JR *) , and it increases the profits by eq' (x)dE without affecting expected 
repayment . It cont radicts the fact that the contract is optimal. • 
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Since (I R) constraint binds for the firms that cannot attain the first-best, their investment scale is 
determined by this binding (J R) constraint once the collateralization rates in the failure state is identified. 
Since we know the collateralization rates for almost all range of investment scale from Proposition 1.3, the 
next proposition completes the identification of the optimal contract, showing the optimal collateralization 
rates for the threshold level of investment. 
Lemma 5 For a given set of the land share w, the market interest rate 1r and the liquidation cost t , there is 
a non-empty set of the optimal contracts in which the investment level is x(t , 1r) and the land collateralization 
is r~ = g* (W, w; t, 1r), for g* E (0, 1) . Moreover, the level of land collateralization g* is unique for all levels 
of the collateralizable assets W in the set. 
Proof of Lemma 5. We first show that (1) there exists a non-empty set of W in which the optimal 
investment size is x( t , 7r). Next , I show that (2) within this set, the optimal land liquidation ( r~) is a 
decreasing function of the total assets W , and that the function is unique for all W in this set. 
(1) Let's first define the sets of W that can achieve the high-scale as well as low-scale investment. Define 
w-(w;1r,t) ={wE R+IVx ~ x(t,1r),[1- (1- p)(1- t)w]w = x(1 +1r)}, and w+(w ;1r,t) ={wE 
R+IVx ~ x(t, 1r) , [1- (1- p)w] = x(1 + 1r)} . w- (w; 1r, t) is the set of w that allows the firm to attain 
only the low-scale investment defined as X< x(t, 7r) . Similarly, w+(w; 7r, t) is the set of w that allows 
the firm to attain the high-scale investment defined as X> x(t, 1r). 
Now I will find the upper-bound of W-(w;1r,t) and the lower-bound of W+(w;1r,t). For all W ~ 
supW-(w;1r , t), WE W-(w;1r,t). And for all W ~ infW+(w;1r,t), WE w+(w;1r,t). From the 
definition of two sets, 
W - ( ) __ x~( t-'-, 1r--')~( 1_+.:__1r )!._._ sup w· 1r t = 
' ' 1- (1- p)(1- t)w (1.17) 
. fw+( . t) = x(t , 7r)(1+7r) 
m w, 1r , 1- (1- p)w · (1.18) 
Both sup w- (w; 1r , t) and inf w+(w ; 1r, t) are increasing in w. Since I have sup w- (w; 1r, t) < inf w+(w; 1r, t) 
as long as t < 1, the overlap of the two sets over R+ is non-empty for all w but w = 0. 
(2) Since (ICs) is binding and r'f = 1, the firm 's expected payment for W E (sup w- , inf w+ ) is 
p(M + L) + (1- p)(M + gL) , where g E (0, t) is the fraction of land to be liquidated to repay in the 
failure state. g is bounded above by L ( < 1) by construction. By rearranging the expression with the 
land share w = L /(M + L) , (IR*) becomes 
{1- (1- p)(1- g)w }W = x(1 +1r) . (1.19) 
Note that (J R* ) binds for all x < xFB. Given the investment size x, the level of the land liquidation 
g is unique for the total assets of a firm W. We argue that for W E (sup w-, inf w+) , the optimal 
investment size is fixed at x = x( t , 1r) and the optimal land liquidation is g = g* (W, w; t , 1r) that 
solves the above equation for x = x( t, 1r). g* is decreasing in W because from the implicit function 
theorem applied to the equation (1.19), dg* j dW = {(1- p)(1- g)w- 1}/ (1- p)wW < 0 for all 
WE (supW-,infw+). 
Since g and W are one-to-one taking x as given, it suffices to show that the optimal level of g is 
g*(W,w;t ,7r) for each WE (supW-,infw+). We prove this claim by the following two steps: (a) 
g ~ g* (li\1, w; t, 1r) under the optimal contract, (b) g ::; g* (W, w; t , 1r) under the optimal contract. 
(a) Suppose otherwise for a contradiction that g < g* (hence x < x(t, 1r)) under the optimal 
contract. Consider to raise g by dE. Since g* < t, this is feasible in (ICj). Binding (IR*) 
• 
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requires x to increase by (1 - p)LdE/(1 + 7r). Then, the resulting change in profits is, from 
(1.11), 
~Profits pq'(x)dx- (1 -p)LdE 
t 
(:(~ ~~~E [tpq'(x)- (1 + 7r)] 
> 0. 
Last inequality comes from the inequality, tpq'(x) > (1 + 7r) for all x < x(t , 7r). Thus, raising 9 
is feasible and profitable, contradiction the fact that the contract is optimal. 
(b) Suppose similarly for a contradiction that 9 > g* (hence x > x(t , 71")) under the optimal contract. 
Consider now to decrease g by dE. This is obviously feasible in (JCj). Binding (IR*) requires 
x to decrease by (1 - p)LdE/ (1 + 7r). Then, the resulting change in profits is 
~Profits (1- p)L I t dE- pq (x)dx 
(:(~ ~~~E [(1 + 7r)- tpq'(x)] 
> 0. 
Last inequality comes from the inequality, tpq' (x) < (1 +7r) for all x > x(t , 7r). Thus, decreasing 
9 is feasible and profitable, contradiction the fact that the contract is optimal . 
Among the firms obtaining the threshold investment scale, the firms with the smallest collateralizable 
assets will collateralize all the land they own. By so doing, they can attain the highest investment scale that 
provides the largest profits net of repayment and the liquidation costs . As the collateralizable asset size W 
increases for a given share of land w , the optimal rate of land collateralization decreases so that the total 
repayment value is unchanged. This is because as the firm size becomes larger, they substitute machines for 
land as collateral. However, keeping relying on land collateral to access to a larger loan is not profitable. 
Firms with highest collateralizable assets that obtain the threshold scale x will not liquidate land as they 
own large enough value of machines. • 
Proposition 1.1 (Extensive and Intensive Margins of Deregulation) When the land regulation is 
repealed, and hence the land transaction costs are removed (t -t 1), all landed firms gain from the intensive 
margin, while only relatively large landed firms gain from the extensive margin. More precisely, 
1. (Extensive Margin) Threshold level of the investment below which firms fully collateralize land in-
creases: &x(t , 7r)/8t > 0. Moreover, it reaches the first-best level of loan when the transaction costs 
are fully removed (lim x(t , 7r) = x FB ). 
t-tl 
2. (Intensive Margin) Collateral value of a unit of land improves. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First part of this Proposition is easily obtained from the definition of x(t ; 7r). 
Since it is defined to satisfy tpq'(x) = 1 + 71" , by applying the Implicit Function Thoerem to this equation, I 
get 
ax(t ; 7r) = _ q' (x) > 0 dt tq" (x) ' (1.20) 
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since q"(x) < 0 for all x. Furthermore, since we know that in the first best contract , pq'(xFB) = 1 + 7r is 
satisfied, we have tq' (x) = pq' ( xF B), implying that 
(t -1)q'(x) = q'(xFB)- q'(x) < o. (1.21) 
The left hand side of the equality converges to zero as t approaches 1, since q' (x) converges to a some positive 
number. This completes the proof. 
Second point of the proposition can be directly shown by looking at the effect on the small scale invest-
ment. Pledgeability of a firm with a low scale investment can be expressed W(t; w, W) = {1- (1- p)(1- t)w} W, 
and the marginal effect of the deregulation on the pledgeability of the relatively small firms is 
8W(t;w, W) _ (1 _ ) W 0 8t - pw > ' (1.22) 
which allows the firm with the collateralizable assets , W, and the land share, w, to access a larger loan. • 
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Figure 1·3: General Equilibrium Effect and Net Effect 
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Chapter 2 
Property Rights Improvement and 
Credit Reallocation in Urban 
India: Empirics 
Abstract: This chapter empirically studies the effect of land deregulation on credit access 
by Indian firms. Based on the theoretical predictions in the previous chapter , I estimate 
the impacts of the land deregulation on firms ' credit secured by collateral, and test whether 
the effects are heterogeneous among firms in terms of the size of firms and the land share of 
the collateralizable assets. I find that the land deregulation led to greater land transactions 
overall; and that the deregulation reallocated credit from the landless, landed-small, and 
large firms, to the landed-medium firms . 
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2.1 Introduction 
Credit constraints faced by people in less developed economies are one of the crucial impedi-
ments to economic development , by hampering a process of capital and wealth accumulation 
both at micro and macro levels [Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993) , 
Galor and Zeira (1993)] . Evidence indicates that firms and small enterprises in less de-
veloped economies are severely credit-constrained, even if their marginal rate of return to 
capital is high [Banerjee and Dufl.o (2008), de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)] . Al-
though asymmetric information in credit markets is the fundamental source of the credit 
constraints, insecure property rights worsens the credit constraints as they limit the bor-
rowers' ability to pledge against default with collateral, as emphasized by DeSoto (2000).1 
Interplay between asymmetric information in the credit markets and insecure property rights 
particularly harm the poor households and firms in these economies who need collateral to 
access external financing . Programs of property-rights titling and property reforms are, 
therefore, expected to improve credit access by raising the ability to collateralize assets, 
paving a way toward a sustainable economic development . 
In this chapter, I extend the analyses of the previous chapter and empirically study the 
impacts on borrowers ' credit access of securing private property rights of land and building, 
made possible by an Indian land deregulation. I empirically test the theoretical predictions 
provided in the previous chapter, by using a quasi-experimental repeal of the urban land 
ceilings and regulation (henceforth, simply "land regulation") , which was implemented in 
more than 60 of the largest Indian cities/urban agglomerations in 1999, and a panel dataset 
1 Malfunctioning financial institutions are other sources of credit constraints , as they restrict one's ability 
to utilize a full capacity to relax the constraint. Judicial reforms in India to more efficiently process the 
disputes over debt recovery and collateral seizure are studied by von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria 
(forthcoming) , Vig (2011) and Visaria (2009) . 
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of Indian firms. In particular, I assess whether the property-rights improvement results in 
an average increase in credit access, or in a reallocation of credit across borrowers. 
For more than 20 years in the late 20th century, Indian firms and households in major 
large cities have experienced an artificial restriction of property rights of land and buildings. 
Until it was repealed in 1999, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act , enacted by the 
parliament of India in 1976, provided ceiling limits in holdings of vacant land, prohibited 
transfers of land and buildings, and restricted building construction in 64 of the largest ur-
ban agglomerations, limiting the owners ' exclusive rights to use and transfer the real estate 
assets. In practice, the limited rights of use and transfers of land effectively restricted land 
transactions. Hence, the deregulation made it possible for land to be transferred (to credi-
tors or purchasers) , thus allowing for a greater use of land as collateral for loans. In 1999, 
the Repeal Act gave rights to repeal the regulation to state governments of India, providing 
a variation in status and timing of the land deregulation across states and years. By 2003 , 
all the union territories (including Delhi) and the states of Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjub, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, have repealed the regu-
lation , while the states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar , Maharashtra, and West Bengal, 
kept it effective until 2008. I use this variation as a source of exogenous change in prop-
erty rights to estimate the deregulation impacts in a difference-in-differences identification 
strategy. 
Property-rights improvement changes the incentives of the treated people, as widely 
discussed in the literature. 2 I argue in this paper that in the case of credit access, property-
2 Existing literature consistently finds that more secure property rights cause higher income per-capita 
[Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)), induce more investment [Besley (1995) , Goldstein and Udry 
(2008) , Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010), Hornbeck (2010) , Johnson , McMillan and Woodruff (2002)), and 
reallocate resources to more productive use [Field (2007) , Wang (2011), Wang (forthcoming)] . See Besley 
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rights improvement induces more land collateralizations and more frequent land transac-
tions , and that the credit impacts are largely driven by these behavioral responses. In 
particular, I empirically assess how property-rights improvement results in an increase in 
land liquidity, measured by the transaction likelihood, and show that the liquidity mecha-
nism plays a key role in connecting the improved land rights with the ultimate effects on 
borrowings. As a result of improved land liquidity, the property rights improvement raises 
the leverage of land collateral, allowing for a uniform increase in credit access of firms with 
land collateral. I call this improvement in the leverage of land collateral "the intensive 
margin of the deregulation effect". 
The degree to which a firm is affected by a property-rights improvement is governed 
by a mixture of the extensive, as well as intensive, margins of the effect, which are, in 
turn, determined by their landholdings and the size of the collateralizable assets , and the 
potential general-equilibrium effects. 
In addition to the partial-equilibrium impacts, negative general-equilibrium effects may 
arise to the extent that the increased aggregate demand for credit improves the lenders ' 
opportunity cost of credit. Then the net effects may be negative for landless, landed-small, 
and/ or large firms , since the direct effects for them are so small that the general-equilibrium 
effects are likely to dominate the direct effects. The previous chapter predicts that the large 
general-equilibrium effects can kill the average increase in credit demand, leaving the net 
effect to be a reallocation of credit among borrowers. 
I use a panel dataset of urban Indian firms from the Prowess database from the Center 
for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE) , to fully control for the time-invariant firm fixed 
and Ghatak (2010) for the extensive review of the literature. 
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effects and to allow for a heterogeneity across firms in the initial size and the landholdings. 
Over the sample period 1991 through 2007, the treatment group is made up of states 
that repealed the land regulation after 1999 until 2003, while the control group includes 
states that kept it active for the entire sample period. I first compare observations of firms 
in the treatment states before and after the land deregulation , and then compare them 
with observations of firms in the control states before and after the land deregulation. In 
estimating heterogeneous effects, I additionally compare firms within the treatment states 
in terms of firm size and the landholdings. 
Empirical analysis shows that the land deregulation makes it more likely that the firms 
in the treatment states participate in both sides of the land market. Nonetheless , I find 
statistically significant estimates only from a subsample of the mega cities where the ceiling 
limit was tightest at 500m2 , but not from the other subsamples of smaller cities with 
relatively slack ceiling limits. I interpret this result as evidence of the distorted asset 
markets only in the tightly regulated areas where the regulation was a binding constraint 
for a large number of firms. Nonetheless, the impacts of the land deregulation are huge 
since in the dataset , more than half the firms are located in the mega cities, and a much 
larger fraction of capital is concentrated in the mega cities. 
Despite the evidence of the improved land liquidity, the estimated average effects on 
secured borrowings are small in magnitude and not statistically significant for both full 
and sub-samples, similar to the findings of Field and Torero (2006). On the other hand, I 
find significant heterogeneous treatment effects for different categories of firms in the mega 
cities, and the estimated effects are consistent with the predictions of the model. The 
estimated heterogeneous effects on secured borrowings indicate evidence of the inverted-
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U shaped treatment effects, by which the medium-sized landed firms benefit the most , 
while the landless , landed-small, and large firms all reduce their borrowing. The estimated 
heterogeneous effects thus suggest that the deregulation reallocates credit among borrowers, 
instead of raising the average credit access. Heterogeneous effects are quite robust to an 
inclusion of various kinds of state-trends. Additional results of comparison of pre-trends 
in treatment and control firms indicate that the observed effects are not driven by the 
differential pre-trends. Finally, I find no average, as well as heterogeneous, effects on credit 
access in places where land liquidity did not improve, consistent with the argument of the 
role of land liquidity in connecting property rights and credit access. 
This paper contributes to a recent literature of estimating the effect of improving prop-
erty rights on credit access. A body of reaserch finds little evidence of an increase in the 
average credit access when land rights improve. Field and Torero (2006) find that the Peru-
vian program of land titling did not increase the access to credit from private banks, while it 
increased the access to credit from the public banks. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find 
that the Argentinian program of land titling during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a only 
modest increase in mortgage loans, but not in the other forms of loans. Wang (forthcoming) 
finds that the Chinese housing reform allowed households to finance their entrepreneural 
activities by capitalizing on the value of the housing properties that they had rented from 
the state but purchased at subsidized prices. This chapter, instead, provides evidence of 
credit reallocation among borrowers. 
This paper is not the first to consider the distributional consequences of a particular 
source of financial development. Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (forthcoming) consider the 
distributional effect of the property rights improvement in a theoretical setting, stressing 
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the role of the competition among lenders. 3 von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria 
(forthcoming) investigate the distributional effect of institutionally improving creditor rights 
to recover their credit, stressing the lenders' outside option, the point I take up in this 
paper.4 This paper thus joins these papers, by addressing that the land deregulation may 
not result in financial development in average terms, while it reallocates credit among 
borrowers. 
The following sections are organized as follows. Section 2 explains the dataset I use 
in the empirical analysis, and my identification strategy. Section 3 discusses the effect on 
the secured borrowings and shows the results. Section 4 discusses the effect on the land 
liquidity and shows the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Data and Identification Strategy 
In the empirical section of this paper, I use a panel dataset of Indian firms . Data come 
from the Prowess database by the Center for Monitoring oflndian Economy (CMIE), which 
covers large parts of all industries, mostly from the manufacturing sector, for the period 
1989 through 2008. According to the CMIE, the companies covered in the database account 
for more than 70% of industrial output , 75% of all corporate taxes, and more than 95% of 
excise duties collected by India's government. The database includes all companies traded 
on India's major stock exchanges, and several others including the central public sector 
3 They suggest that the effects are non-linear and heterogeneous by borrowers' wealth, consistent with 
my results. They also suggest that without a sufficient degree of lender competition, all the benefits of the 
improved property rights accrue to the lenders, instead of to the borrowers, which is again consistent with 
my results. 
4 They find , similar to my results , that the credit is progressively reallocated from the small firms to the 
large firms. Together with von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2010), they stress the importance of the 
general-equilibrium effect of a policy. The point of their argument is that an institutional change aiming at 
expanding the set of contracts that debtors can access could change the relative position of creditors in a 
contract. 
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enterprises, although private sector firms account for 92% of the total number of firms in 
the Prowess database, and they account for about half the total sales. 27% of Prowess 
companies are listed on either one of the two major Indian stock exchanges.5 Information 
contained in the database mainly comes from the annual reports of companies (balance 
sheets and income & expenditure statements), in which all (registered) Indian firms are 
required by the Companies Act of 1956 to disclose information on financial as well as 
quantitative information on production, sales, consumption of raw materials, and energy 
use. 
I use a sample of firms that are in either treatment states or control states. There 
are ten treatment states that repealed the land regulation, the ULCRA, in or after 1999, 
whereas there are five control states that had the regulation throughout the sample period 
over 1991-2007. The end of the sample period is chosen as the year 2007, because states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra repealed the regulation in the year 2008, but my dataset 
does not have a sufficient number of observations in and after the year 2008. I exclude 
firms located outside the 61 cities targeted by the land regulation, since those firms are 
not affected by both the regulation and deregulation. I also exclude firms that are foreign-
owned, government-owned, or in financial or real estate sectors. Foreign-owned firms are 
likely to have access to foreign credit markets, and a large part of their external funds 
may be raised outside India. Similarly, the government-owned firms may be funded by the 
government bodies in a way that non-government-owned firms cannot be funded. Financial 
firms are net suppliers of credit. Firms in the real estate sector are directly affected by the 
(de )regulation, so that the deregulation effect for these firms embeds an increase in credit 
5They are the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange. 
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demand arising from operational reasons, rather than from the institutional improvement 
per se. I use the year 1990 as the base year of my variables of firm characteristics as defined 
below. Base year 1990 is eight years before the land regulation is repealed, and discussion 
of repealing it merely started at the time. Therefore, the firm characteristics in the base 
year 1990 barely reflect expectations of the future deregulation of land in 1999. To further 
avoid unnecessary simultaneity, I use the sample over the period 1991-2007 in the empirical 
analysis, for which there are eight years both before and after the land deregulation at 1999. 
In the following empirical analyses, I examine sub-samples of firms in different categories 
of cities. Main reasons for this decomposition come from (1) the institutional environment , 
and from (2) the nature of the dataset. First, as described in the previous section, the land 
regulation designated tighter land ceilings for larger cities. For example, the biggest four 
cities (Chennai , Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai) had 500m2 of the ceiling limit. Therefore, it is 
more likely that firms in the larger cities were facing binding constraints as a result of the 
land regulation, creating room for heterogeneous deregulation impacts across categories of 
city size. Second, most of the firms in the database are located in larger cities. For example, 
more than half the firms are in the biggest four cities. To avoid picking up effects of firms' 
self-selection into larger cities as the effect of repealing the tighter regulation, I need to 
compare firms that clear the same criteria of self-selection into larger cities. In estimating 
the heterogeneous effects across firms within a category of cities with the same ceiling limit , 
focusing on decomposed sub-samples, allows me to control for self-selection of firms into 
cities with the different size and ceiling limits. 
I construct variables that characterize the firms . First, city indicates the city (or district) 
where each firm locates, constructed from the information on registered office address. 
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Unfortunately, the Prowess database does not provide detailed information on the exact 
locations of their landholdings. 6 I therefore , instead, assume that firms ' landholdings are 
located in the same city as the registered office address. Land and Building is the bookvalue 
of land and buildings that a firm owns to use in production, net of accumulated depreciation. 
Collateralizable Assets is the bookvalue, net of accumulated depreciation, of tangible assets 
of a firm , which include Land and Building, Plant and Machineries. I also call it the firm-size 
in the following discussion. Share of Land and Building is the ratio of Land and Building to 
Collateralizable Assets, which by definition takes on a value between zero and one. Our main 
outcome variable, Secured Borrowing, is the net borrowing backed by collateral. Repeal is 
an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the land regulation is not effective in 
the state a firm locates, and zero otherwise. 
Inability to precisely locate firms ' landholdings potentially generates measurement errors 
in Land and Building. Although the data limitation on the locations of firms ' landholdings 
force us to assume that they hold land in the same city as the registered office, firms may hold 
plots of land in other areas. More important, they may hold land both in the regulated and 
the non-regulated areas. To the extent that this is the case, treating the whole landholding 
of a firm in a same manner generates a measurement error. Since large firms are more 
likely to have large landholdings, the measurement error, if ever, should be large for large 
firms. Despite this potential attenuation bias, I show in the following empirical section of 
estimating the effect on borrowings, that the magnitude of the estimates are quite large and 
statistically significant. 
6 Although the Prowess database provides some information, including locations of land and buildings, 
at the plant level, I do not use that information for the following reasons. First, it is only for listed firms , 
which comprise 27% of the total number of firms in the Prowess database, that provide plant-level data. 
Second, the segmentation of the business is left to the discretion of firms , still leaving ambiguous what part 
of land and buildings are located in the regulation areas. 
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My identification strategy comes from the difference-in-differences estimation, in which 
variations in the deregulation status across states and years are exploited. This strategy 
is valid as far as the variations across states and years are driven by factors that are not 
correlated with my outcome variables that are the land trades and the secured borrowings. 
In other words, the decision by and timing of the state governments' adopting the federal 
repeal of the ULCRA needs to be reasonably exogenous to the outcome variables. 
2.3 Credit Market Impacts of Repealing the ULCRA 
In this section, I estimate the effects of the land deregulation on borrowings of Indian firms 
in two distinct but related specifications. The first specification examines the heterogeneous 
effects in terms of two dimensions of firm characteristics: landholdings and collateralizable 
assets. The second specification examines, in addition, non-linear effects in collateralizable 
assets. Choice of specifications depends on the assumption I make in the size distribution 
of Indian firms. In particular, non-linear effects may not appear if firms are distributed in a 
low range of size, whereas such effects will appear if there are large firms that can attain the 
first-best contract. I explore both of these two assumptions in two different specifications 
below. 
2.3.1 Empirical Strategy to Estimate the Deregulation Impacts on Credit 
Access 
The theoretical analysis in the previous section indicates that the treatment effects of re-
pealing the land regulation are heterogeneous in terms of two of the firm characteristics. 
First , heterogeneity in the collateralization strategy of firms results in a variation in the 
treatment effect: given the land share in assets, medium-sized firms , that do not use land 
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as collateral under the ULCRA regime, will begin to rely on the land collateral for credit, 
and hence raise the external funds more, while small firms enjoy only an improvement of 
land liquidity and large firms will not gain from the land deregulation. Second, different 
land shares in assets result in heterogeneous treatment effects: given the size of a firm , firms 
with a larger share of land in assets, will increase pledgeability by more, since firms with 
the same size ought to have the same level of pledgeability, had there not been the ULCRA, 
regardless of the composition of collateral assets . However, heterogeneous treatment effects 
with respect to the land share in assets appear only in the low range of firm size for a given 
land share. Relatively large firms, but not large enough to reach the first-best contract, will 
not gain further from larger landholdings. Threshold level in firm size, above which there 
is no heterogeneous effect in the land share in assets and below which the treatment effect 
increases with the land share, increases as the land share increases. 
Under the assumption that firms are distributed in a relatively lower range of the asset-
size taking given the land share in assets, our empirical specification is then formulated as 
follows: loan market outcomes for firm i in state s in year t is 
lnxist = j3 1Repeal8 t + /12 (Repealst X ln Wi) 
+/13 (Repealst X wi) + ,84 (Repealst X ln wi X wi) + Ci +At+ Eist· (2.1) 
Full specification of regressions include various kinds of covariates. In all specifications, we 
add year fixed effects. Year dummy controls for the macroeconomic shocks that affect both 
treatment and control groups in the same way in a given year. As another aggregate-level 
fixed effects, we add the interaction of year dummy with the initial level of the collateraliz-
able collateralizable assets. This additional control picks up the time-varying effect of the 
50 
initial asset size at the macroeconomic level. 7 Similarly, I also add the interaction of year 
dummies with the initial land share in assets, which picks up the macroeconomic shock that 
is heterogeneous in land share. 8 
Another set of controls are state-specific trends, which control for the differences in 
trends of credit growth across states. Including this additional control also serves as a ro-
bustness check of our identification strategy. If the statistical significance on the coefficients 
of interest is lost by including the state-specific trends, it means that the adoption of repeal-
ing the ULCRA is largely statistically associated with the state trends in credit. We also 
take into account the state-specific trends by total asset size and land share. For example, 
small firms as of 1994 in Delhi, one of our treatment states, may be in a faster-growing trend 
than small firms in Maharashtra that belong to the control group. Therefore, including the 
state-specific trends trims out all the trend differences in credit across the narrowly defined 
cells: first by state, then by the state-asset size cell and/ or by the state-land size cell. 
If firms are distributed more widely in terms of the size, the precise specification should 
include the size squared to fully take into account the non-linear inverted-U shaped treat-
ment effects. As an alternative specification of a more general form, and also as a sort of 
the robustness check, I run the regression of the following specification: 
7 For example, during the sample period of our study, only a part of all cohorts of firms are targeted for 
a special credit provision [Banerjee and Duflo (2008)]. By allowing this control to be time-varying, it picks 
up the effect of the targeted credit provision at the nation level. 
8 For example, Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests 
Act of 2002, known as the SARFAESI Act, improved the secured creditor rights by allowing them to seize 
the collateral assets as soon as the borrower decides to go bankrupt, which may or may not improve the 
loan contracting of a. given firm [Vig (2011)]. 
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I add the same controls for this specification, as for the baseline specification. As implied 
from the theoretical analysis , and in particular from Figure 1·3, the net effect of the dereg-
ulation will be heterogeneously shaped as an inverted-D. A fifth term is included to account 
for the inverted-U shaped treatment effects, given the land share in assets. To the extent 
that the treatment effects are indeed the inverted-U shape in terms of firm size, after con-
trolling for land share in assets, I expect to obtain a negative estimate for (3 5 and a positive 
estimate for (36 . I expect a positive estimate of (36 because the peak of the inverted-U 
shaped treatment effects should appear in the medium range of firm size. Prediction of the 
sign of (34 is difficult to obtain, as it reflects the direction of a change in the peak of the 
inverted-U treatment effects as the land share in assets w increases. As w increases, only 
both tails of the distribution over size, experience an increase in the treatment effect. 
2.3.2 Results on Secured Borrowings 
Table 2.4 shows the difference--in-differences estimates of the land deregulation on the se-
cured borrowings for the full sample of Indian firms. The dependent variable is a log of the 
outstanding secured borrowings. The estimate in column (1) indicates that the average im-
pact is small in magnitude and not statistically significant. Columns (2), (3) , and (4) show 
results for heterogeneous effects in terms of firm characteristics. In all specifications, the 
estimates on Repeal are consistently positive and statistically insignificant, implying that 
the theoretical prediction of the negative general-equilibrium effects are unlikely working. 
In column (2), the estimate of the effect of the interaction between Repeal and the firm 
size is negative, a sign in the opposite direction as predicted by theory, but statistically 
insignificant. I find a statistically and economically significant estimate of the coefficient 
on Repeal interacted with the land share in assets, in the direction predicted by theory. 
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The estimate implies that a one percentage point increase in the land share, all else being 
constant, is associated with a 0.4 percentage points increase in the treatment effect of the 
land deregulation. The estimate on the triple interaction among R epeal, the firm size, and 
the land share is positive but not statistically significant. Specifications in columns (3) and 
(4) check whether the treatment effects are inverted-U shaped in terms of firm size, after 
controlling for the land share. Although the signs of the estimates of the interaction terms 
are the same as the theory predicts, most of the estimates are statistically insignificant. 
Positively significant effect of the interaction between Repeal and the land share lost its 
magnitude and statistical significance in both specifications. 
Next , I use four different subsamples of firms that experienced different intensities of the 
land regulation. This decomposition is motivated by the fact that a large part of firms in 
our dataset are located in biggest cities with tightest ceiling limit in landholdings at 500m2 . 
Table 2.5 shows the results for the subsample of Indian firms in A-cities and the smaller 
others. The left panel of Table 2.5 shows the estimates from the subsample of A-cities, 
and the right panel from the subsample of the other smaller cities. In both subsamples, 
the average effects in columns (1) and (5) are small in magnitude, ranging from 3.6 to 4.8 
percentage points , but not statistically significant. 
Once I take into account the heterogeneity across firms , however, I obtain statistically 
significant estimates from A-cities, which are exactly consistent with the theoretical pre-
dictions for all the specifications in. columns (2), (3), and (4). The negative estimates on 
R epeal from the subsample of A-cities imply that there are general-equilibrium effects of 
the increased lenders ' opportunity costs of credit , possibly through an increase in interest 
rates. The magnitude of the negative effects on the smallest group of firms ranges from 
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42 to 57 percentage points, which is a substantial reduction in secured borrowings. Ac-
cording to the estimates in column (2), the firms with a little less than the average size 
and the average land share in assets break even in terms of the treatment effect, the point 
at which the positive treatment effects of the land deregulation are offset by the negative 
general-equilibrium effect. Compared to the break-even firms, firms that are larger in size 
are affected positively, while firms that are smaller are negatively affected. For firms with 
the average level of initial land share in assets at 0.28, the break-even firms are as large as 
17.51 Rs.Crore as of 1990, which is about 44 percentile of the size distribution of firms. 9 
Similarly, firms that have a higher land share in assets are positively affected in comparison 
to the break-even firms , while firms that have a lower land share in assets are negatively 
affected. For firms of the average size at 97.35 Rs.Crore, the break-even firms have at least 
as large as 10.8 percents of the assets in the form of land and building.l0 
Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the treatment effects are indeed in the inverted-U 
shape, and the peak of the inverted-U shaped treatment effects are somewhere in the medium 
in size. I add as an additional regressor the interaction term of Repeal with the firm-
size squared. To the extent that the effects are nonlinearly inverted-U shaped, we should 
have a negative estimate of a coefficient on this variable, and a positive estimate on the 
interaction between Repeal and the firm size. The estimated coefficients are economically 
and statistically significant , and the signs of the estimates are in the predicted directions. 
Inclusion of the triple interaction among Repeal, the firm size, and the land share does not 
significantly change the magnitude of the estimates on the interactions of Repealst with the 
9 17.06 R.s.Crore is equivalent to $3.89 million, based on the exchange rate at R.s . 45 per U.S . dollar. One 
Rupees Crore is equivalent to ten million rupees . 
10This is about 19 percentile of the distribution in land share in assets. 
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firm size and the size squared. Therefore, as predicted by the theory, firms in the upper-tail 
of the size distribution are relatively more weakly affected by the land deregulation than 
those in the medium range of the distribution, who gain the most. 
The fact that the negative general-equilibrium effect is so huge at 42 to 57 percentage 
points implies that the lenders' supply of credit is quite inelastic with respect to interest 
rates, so an increase in the aggregate demand for credit is suppressed enough to meet the 
supply without changing the total outstanding debt. Combining the results regarding both 
average and heterogeneous effects in the left panel of Table 2.5, credit is considered to be 
reallocated from landless, landed-small and/or large firms to landed-medium firms. 
In the right panel of Table 2.5 , most of the estimates of heterogeneous effects are not sta-
tistically significant in columns (6), (7) , and (8) . The estimates on Repeal are all positively 
insignificant , which implies that there is unlikely general-equilibrium effects. The estimates 
of the deregulation effects for large firms are negatively insignificant , implying that there is 
no heterogeneous effects of the land deregulation in terms of firm size. However , I observe 
statistically significant effects of having a higher land share in assets in columns (6) and 
(8), but not in (7). The estimates imply that only relatively small firms gain from the 
land deregulation through their landholdings, consistent with the theoretical prediction. 
Although inconclusive from the statistical point of view, there are unlikely heterogeneous 
effects in terms of firm size and general-equilibrium effects in the smaller cities. 
Table 2.6 shows results of the robustness check, by examining the inclusion of state 
trends, for the subsample of A-cities. Adding state trends turns the insignificant average 
impact in column (1) into a negatively significant estimate in column (2). This implies the 
possibility that the repealing state, Delhi, had a steeper upward trend in secured borrowings, 
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and that the land deregulation was driven, at least partly, by the pre-1999 trend. However, 
Delhi, one of union territories, did not decide to adopt the repeal of the land regulation on 
its own, and the repeal at the national level was driven by decisions of other states. Thus, 
it is unlikely that the Delhi's repeal of the land regulation was driven by the pre-trend of 
secured borrowings of firms in Delhi. To further investigate the validity of my identifying 
assumption, I examine statistical association between state pre-trend in borrowings and the 
states' adoption of the land deregulation in the next subsection. 
Columns (3) through (11) in Table 2.6 show the results of heterogeneous treatment 
effects of the land deregulation when various state trends are included as additional regres-
sors. I control for two sorts of state trends: average state trend, and asset-specific state 
trends. Adding the asset-specific state trends controls for any differences in trends in the 
borrowings for firms with the same asset holdings across states. Although it imposes strong 
restrictions, I find that the estimates are both qualitatively and quantitatively robust to 
the inclusion of the state trends. 
2.3.3 State Pre-Trend and Adoption of the Repeal of the ULCRA 
In this subsection, I discuss the validity of my empirical strategy. To identify the credit 
market effect of the land deregulation, potential outcomes in the credit markets have to be 
independent of the land deregulation in 1999. However, it may be the case that the state 
governments ' decision on repealing the ULCRA was triggered by state pre-trends in firms' 
borrowings. To address this issue formally, I regress the pre-deregulation trend in secured 
borrowings (1990-1998) onto the state deregulation. 
(2.3) 
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The falsification test of the statistical association between the state pre-trends in outcome 
variables and the deregulation status requires me to find insignificant estimates on (3 when 
the Repeal variable is the sole main regressor. To the extent that the adoption of repealing 
the ULCRA by state governments is induced by the pre-treatment low percentage and level 
changes in credit access, (3 in the above specification ought to be negative and statistically 
significant. .6.ln x;~-98 captures the percentage changes in the secured borrowings of firm 
i in state s over the period. Since the Repeal variable has its variation only across states, 
(3 captures its average correlation with the credit size of firms within each state. I also run 
this regression for the different time spans as 1992-1998, 1994-1998, and 1996-1998 to see 
how the pre-trends in long- and short-urn are associated with the land deregulation. 
Similarly, the variation in timing of the adoption of the federal-level decision on repeal-
ing the ULCRA by the state governments may be caused by the relative performances of 
firms' credit access across states prior to the federal deregulation. By defining Lags as a 
variable that captures the lag in years of adopting the repealing of the ULCRA from the 
federal deregulation in January 1999, I regress the pre-deregulation growth of credit market 
outcomes of firms on the interaction of Repeals with Lags variable too. If the early adoption 
of the federal decision by a state government is chosen because of the bad credit market 
outcomes of firms within the state, the estimate is found to be statistically significant. That 
is, a lower growth rate of credit market outcomes is associated with a smaller lag of the 
adoption by the state government , resulting in a positive estimate of (3. 
Table 2. 7 shows the results of the falsification test. Panel A shows the estimates of 
regressing the pre-treatment credit growth of firms over the period 1990-1998 on the dereg-
ulation decisions made by the state governments. The sample for this panel consists of firms 
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in both treatment and control states that appear in Table 3.1, which include three union 
territories (Chandigarh, Delhi and Pondicherry) where the treatment status is subject to 
the decision by the states of Haryana and Punjub. To account for the potential serial cor-
relation within each state, standard errors are clustered at the state level. The estimates 
suggest that pre-trends in secured borrowings over a various time span are, on average, 
uncorrelated with the later adoption of the Repeal Act by the state governments. However, 
I do observe, in column (2), a statistical association with the deregulation variable of the 
long-term pre-trend of secured borrowings when the lag in years of the adoption is added 
as another regressor; however , such effects disappear long before the federal deregulation 
arrives in 1999. This indicates that early repealer states had different trends in early 1990s 
from the late repealer states, but that the difference disappeared in the late 1990s, before 
the Repeal Act arrived in 1999. I conclude from this table that both the treatment status 
as well as the timing of deregulation by states are plausibly exogenous to the credit market 
outcomes of firms. This result suggests that adding the state trend as an additional control 
can remove a portion of the positive treatment effects to the extent that the trend in the 
treatment states picks up after the land deregulation. 
2.4 Liquidity Impacts of Repealing the ULCRA 
In this section, I estimate the deregulation impact on firms' transaction likelihood of land. 
I argue that to the extent that the land regulation restricted land transactions, the land 
deregulation allows for greater land transactions. 
The mechanism through which the land deregulation affects the credit market outcomes 
is that an improvement in land liquidity results in an increase in the collateral value of 
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land. The empirical strategy of this part of the study is motivated by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) 's argument that the number and the economic conditions of potential buyers of an 
asset raises the liquidation value of the asset. Land liquidity improves when repealing the 
land regulation pushes potential land traders into land markets, by removing the constraints 
that make these potential land traders unwilling to participate in the market. I argued 
in the previous section that the ULCRA set three distinct constraints: the ceiling limits 
in the landholdings, the prohibition of transfers of land, and the regulation of building 
construction. Ceiling limits directly restrict firms from owning or possessing as large a 
size of land as they wish, had there been no limits, which decreases the demand for land. 
Prohibition of transfers effectively makes potential land sellers unwilling to participate in 
the land market for fear of their land being expropriated, which decreases the supply of 
land. Regulation of building construction makes the land holders unwilling to invest in 
the building construction, and therefore, makes the potential land buyers further unwilling 
to invest in land and building construction, leading to a further deterioration of the land 
demand. Repeal of all these sources of distortions would induce potential land traders, both 
demanders and suppliers, to engage in land transactions, making it easier and less costly 
for them (including banks) to match with another trader from the other side of the land 
market. State governments also released land that were acquired under the ULCRA regime, 
after it was repealed. Thus, there will be an influx of land traders, to the extent that the 
land regulation was binding. An improvement of the land liquidity is largely driven by these 
land traders. 
Although the price impact of the land deregulation is ambiguous from the view of the 
Walrasian market because both the demand for , and the supply of, land presumably increase 
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at the time of the land deregulation, prices of a plot of land can increase once the reduction 
in search cost and the resulting increase in land liquidity is taken into account . Literature 
of search and bargaining models based on Diamond (1982) consistently finds that the asset 
prices for more liquid assets become higher than those for less liquid assets , reflecting a 
liquidity premium that the investors are willing to pay for the short search times. Once the 
search friction is taken into account, the improved land liquidity will increase the unit price 
of land, resulting in higher collateral value of land. Although I cannot analyze the effects 
on land prices of the land deregulation since I do not observe land prices over the sample 
period of this study, the collateral value of land should reflect the liquidity premium, an 
increased liquidity, measured by the transaCtion likelihood of land. 
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy to Estimate the Deregulation Impact on Land 
Liquidity 
To empirically estimate the deregulation impacts on land liquidity, I first construct three 
measures ofland liquidity (zijst) from the original data. The three measures are (1) a dummy 
indicating whether a firm is a net buyer of land, (2) a dummy indicating whether a firm 
is a net seller of land, and (3) a dummy indicating whether a firm participates in the land 
market as a net buyer or a net seller in a given year. Since the gross value of land holdings 
is the sum of historical expenditures , Gijst = :L~=oPsr · flgijsr = Pst · flgijst + Gijst-1 , 
where Gijst is the gross value of land and 6-gijst is the amount of land added in a year t. 
By taking the first-differences between years, we get 
D.Gijst = Gijst - Gijst-1 = Pst · 6-gijst· (2.4) 
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Although what we are ultimately interested to know is the impact on t:.gijst, I cannot sepa-
rate it from Pst without the information of land prices. Since I do not have that information, 
I rely on dummies based on t:..Gijst, which fully indicate the direction of the net land trans-
action. In other words, we have t:..Gijst 5 0 {:::::::::? t:.gijst 5 0, given the assumption that 
Pst =I= 0. It is worth noting that in order to precisely capture the impact on the land liquidity, 
I use the gross value of land, rather than the value of land plus buildings, in constructing 
our measures of the land liquidity. 11 Values of buildings potentially include values newly 
invested in buildings, which do not necessarily reflect the market liquidity of land. It is 
interpreted more as capital investment in line with investment in plant and machineries. 
Therefore, in this subsection, I use the gross value of land to extract information regarding 
land transactions. 
My empirical strategy is based on the difference-in-differences estimation of a linear 
probability model. The three measures of land liquidity are regressed on the deregulation 
variable and control variables: 
Zijst = f3Repealst + Ci +At + Eijst· (2.5) 
To take into account the possibility that firms in different industries may have systematically 
different demand for land, time-varying industry fixed effects, <I>tj , are added instead of 
year fixed effects, At , in some specifications. Year dummy controls for macroeconomic 
shocks as well as the confounding factors arising from national-level policies . Since the 
regression is based on the linear probability model, the interpretation of the estimates are 
11 The "land" part of capital consists of land and buildings, while "machines" are composed of plant and 
machineries. Therefore , the notion of capital composition reflects the idea that assets of different generality 
(or specificity) are combined in production. Land and buildings are general in terms of its productive ability, 
while plant and machineries are more industry-specific. 
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straightforward: f3 captures an increase in probability of a firm being either a net buyer or 
seller, or participating in the land market. 
I investigate the average impact of land deregulation on land liquidity from the sample 
of all firms that exist in a given year, which includes entry and exit of firms during the 
sample period. My specification only has Repeal8 t as a main regressor, but no interaction 
terms with firm-characteristics, because we need to know the market-wide liquidity, rather 
than the liquidity for a particular subset of firms. 
2.4.2 Results on Land Liquidity 
Table 2.8 shows the estimates of the deregulation effects on the average land liquidity. 
The measure of land liquidity is an indicator of whether a firm participates in either or 
both side(s) of the land market as a seller or a buyer. Columns (1) and (2) use the full 
sample, while the other columns use the subsamples decomposed by city size in order to 
see the heterogeneous impacts of the different regulation intensities. For each subsamples, 
columns of even numbers include the time-varying industry fixed effects to control for the 
differential trend in demand for land by different industries. Panel I shows the estimates of 
the regression of land transactions as the outcome variable, which is an indicator of whether 
a firm is either a net buyer or seller of land in a given year. Although the results from 
the full sample show economically and statistically insignificant effects on land liquidity, 
results from decomposed subsamples show significant increases in transaction probabilities. 
I find an increase in land transactions at 1-percent level of significance in A-cities, whereas 
increases in smaller cities are less significant at 10-percent. Panel II shows the results of 
the buying probability, where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm is a 
net buyer of land in a given year. I find a statistically significant effect on the land-buying 
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probability for firms in A-cities, where the regulation was most stringent in terms of the 
ceiling limits of land holding. Inclusion of time-varying industry fixed effects in column ( 4) 
does not change the magnitude of the estimate and the standard error, suggesting that an 
increase in the buying probability is not driven by a surge in the need for land for some 
industries during the sample period. I also find statistically significant estimates from firms 
in smaller cities, but the significance is at 10-percent. Panel III shows the similar results for 
the land-selling probability, where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm 
is a net seller of land in a given year. I again find significantly positive effects only for firms 
in A-cities. The probability of buying and selling both increased by about 1 percentage 
point in A-cities. In smaller cities, however, the estimates are not statistically significant. 
Overall, the transaction likelihood of land increased in both sides of land markets in A-
cities, whereas its increase in smaller cities were limited, particularly in the supply side of 
the markets. From the analyses of this section, I conclude that the land liquidity improved 
in A-cities, but not in the other cities. Although we find some evidence of the improved land 
liquidity in B-cities, it also suggests that the effect is too weak to appear as a statistically 
significant net effect. Findings from the previous section that the significant heterogeneous 
effects on borrowings are found only in A-cities are driven in part by the observed increase 
in land liquidity, because as the theoretical model predicts, the behavioral responses to the 
land deregulation are considered to be caused by an improvement of land liquidity. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the quantitative effects of repealing the land ceilings and 
regulations that had restricted the land transactions in urban area of India for at least 
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a quarter of century. The key contribution of the chapter is the finding that credit was 
reallocated among borrowers in the Indian context, or more formally that the landless, and 
landed-small and large firms all reduced their borrowing backed by collateral, while the 
landed medium-sized firms increased their secured borrowings after land deregulation. 
Empirical results are consistent with the model of the previous chapter, suggesting that 
the general-equilibrium effects seem to work and that credit is reallocated among firms . 
Nonetheless, these effects are only observed in the mega cities where the ceiling limits 
of landholdings were tightest under the land regulation. Regression estimates on land 
transactions suggest that the deregulation improved land liquidity in the mega cities, but 
not in the other cities. 
There are a few limitations of this chapter. First , the dataset did not allow me to 
precisely locate each firms' landholdings, creating measurement error in the landholdings 
and the attenuation bias in the estimates. However , the estimates are robustly significant, 
and are large in magnitude, suggesting that the true effects may be much larger had there 
not been measurement error. Second, due to data limitations, I could not examine the 
impact of borrower 's interest rates. Although the Prowess Database contains the total 
interest payments of firms , it did not allow me to analyze how interest rates of secured loans 
changed after the land deregulation. As a result, the degree of the general-equilibrium effect 
could not be directly examined. 
Finally, the effect of the resulting credit allocation on productivity or the firm growth is 
left unanswered. Results of de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) reveal that the severely 
credit-constrained firms increase the return to capital after grants of cash or in-kind are 
provided, implying that the land deregulation of India may have indirect impacts on the 
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firms ' production and the industry dynamics. This issue is left for the future study. 
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2.A Data Appendix 
Our main explanatory variable Repeal is constructed as follows . First, I assume that the 
firm's production is mainly taken place where the firm's headquarter is located. The Prowess 
has information on the address of the firm's headquarter , from which I assign the city to 
each firm. I also assume that the firms in the dataset never relocated over the sampling 
period 1990-2007, so long as their headquarters are located in the same city. Secondly, city 
are classified to two groups, either urban or rural, among which the urban cities fall into 
one of the categories A, B, C or D, shown in the table 3.2. The other group of City is the 
rural cities in which firms were never affected by the ULCRA. Lastly, Repeal is given one 
if City is in the urban cities of the states that repealed the ULCRA in a given year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Since I use the Prowess of only the period 1990-2007, there are five non-repealing states 
of the ULCRA, namely Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Assam, Bihar, and West Bengal, 
although the first two repealed it in 2008. These states are the control group in the empirical 
analyses that follow. States of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur , Meghlaya, Tripura 
had repealed the ULCRA at some points , but there were no urban agglomeration that falls 
in the categories from A through D for which the Act was in effect at the time of repeal. 
Thus, no firm in these states was affected by the ULCRA in any way. States that never 
regulated land transactions will be used as another control group. Classification of states 
into the treatment and control groups is shown in Table 3.1 with a variation in timing of 
the land deregulation. 
Our main outcome variable is the net value of outstanding borrowings secured by collat-
erals. I use the variables of assets: Collateralizable Assets is the sum of the net values of real 
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estate assets, plant and machineries. I calculate from this variable the land share in assets, 
w, as a ratio of the net value of real estate assets to the net value of the collateralizable 
assets. I do not use just land, but the sum of land and building as the variable concerning 
land in the empirical analysis that follows. 
I use the base-year values of Land Share, Land and Building and Collateralizable Assets 
in 1990 as the initial levels . Later I examine the heterogeneous impacts of the land dereg-
ulation based on these initial values. This is to avoid the endogeneity of these variables, 
caused by the reverse causality from the credit size to these firm characteristics. Plus, the 
base year 1990 is 9 years before the repeal of the ULCRA is taken place, so I assume that 
the levels of these variables in 1990 are not affected by the expectation of the future repeal 
of the ULCRA. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
25th 50th 75th 
Mean S.D. Min percentile percentile percentile Max 
Full Sample 
Collateralizable Assets 147.1 919.3 0 6.441 22.21 70.35 48 ,351 
Land and Building 28.50 108.3 0 1.708 5.387 18.32 4,918 
Share of Land and Building 0.330 0.247 0 0.149 0.260 0.452 1 
In( Collateralizable Assets) 3.199 1.715 0 2.007 3.145 4.268 10.79 
ln(Land and Building) 1.003 0.910 0 0.400 0.749 1.310 6.866 
Collateralizable Assets in 1990 90.63 258.1 0 7.383 22.17 61.85 3,080 
Land and Building in 1990 15.72 37.53 0 1.458 4.239 12.47 449.2 
Share of Land and Building in 1990 0.256 0.202 0 0.122 0.200 0.327 1 
ln(Collateralizable Assets in 1990) 3.183 1.560 0 2.126 3.143 4.141 8.033 
ln(Land and Building in 1990) 0.742 0.629 0 0.367 0.592 0.920 4.662 
Secured Borrowing 102.7 408.5 0 5.040 18.27 61.39 14,562 
ln(Secured Borrowing) 2.985 1.747 0 1.798 2.959 4.133 9.586 
Repeal 0.125 0.331 0 0 0 0 1 
N 13,044 
#.Firms 1,011 
Sub-Sample of A-cities 
Collateralizable Assets 166.4 1,113 0 5.155 19.38 69.59 48,351 
Land and Building 33.96 130.0 0 1.446 5.447 20.41 4,918 
Share of Land and Building 0.361 0.263 0 0.162 0.293 0.509 1 
In( Collateralizable Assets) 3.114 1.810 0 1.817 3.015 4.257 10.79 
ln(Land and Building) 1.084 0.984 0 0.404 0.815 1.446 6.839 
Collateralizable Assets in 1990 97.35 277.5 0 5.948 20.74 62.33 3,080 
Land and Building in 1990 18.38 43.30 0 1.327 4.375 13.40 449.2 
Share of Land and Building in 1990 0.280 0.215 0 0.131 0.227 0.367 1 
ln(Collateralizable Assets in 1990) 3.121 1.646 0 1.938 3.079 4.148 8.033 
ln(Land and Building in 1990) 0.811 0.710 0 0.372 0.621 1.028 4.662 
Secured Borrowing 108.6 467.8 0 3.950 15.31 55.93 14,562 
ln(Secured Borrowing) 2.872 1.804 0 1.599 2.792 4.042 9.586 
Repeal 0.0681 0.252 0 0 0 0 1 
N 8,194 
# . Firms 629 
Note: Land is the gross book value. Building is the book value of building for production , net of accumula t ed 
depreciation. Collaterolizable Assets consist of Land and Building and Machineries that are the book value 
of plant and machineries , net of accumulated depreciation. Share of Land and Building is the ratio of Land 
and Building to Collateralizable Assets. Variables in log are calculated by taking logarithm of original values 
after adding one, in order to keep observations with a value less than one. All the financial variables are 
deflated by the Wholesale Price Index at March 2003, and reported in unit of 10 million Indian Rupees 
(equivalent to 1 Crore Rs.) . 
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Table 2.2: Timing of the Repal of the ULCRA by the State Gov-
ernments 
YEAR OF 
REPEAL 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2008 
Not yet repealed 
STATE 
Chandigarh, Delhi, Pondicherry, Punjub 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh 
Madhya Pradesh 
Rajasthan 
Orissa 
Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra 
Assam, Bihar, West Bengal 
Note: The ULCRA was repealed during the fiscal year that ends at the 
end of March of specified years. States of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Manipur, Meghlaya, Tripura had repealed the ULCRA at some points, but 
there were no urban agglomeration that falls in the categories A through 
D for which the land ceiling was in effect at the time of repeal. Among 
the earliest repealer states, Chandiharh, Delhi, and Pondicherry are the 
Union Territories and are directly governed by the federal government. 
Table 2.3: Ceiling Limits and Status of ULCRA 
ULCRA Repealed Not Repealed Yet 
Land Ceilings 
A Delhi 
500m2 
B 
1000m2 
c 
!500m2 
D 
2000m2 
Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Kanpur 
Agra, Allahadad, Arnritsar , Bareilly, 
Bhopal, Gwalior, Hubli-Dharwar , 
Indore, Jabalpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, 
Lucknow, Ludhiana, Meerut, 
Mysore, Rajkot, Surat, Vadodara, 
Varanasi 
Aligarh, Ajmer , Belgaum, 
Bhavanagar, Bikaner, Chandigarh, 
Cuttack, Dehradun, Durg-
Bhilainagar, Jamnagar, Gorakhpur , 
Jullundur, Kota, Mangalore, 
Moradabad, Nagpur, Pondicherry, 
Raipur, Saharanpur, Ujjain 
Kolkata, Mumbai 
Hyderabad, Pune 
Dhanbad, Jarnshedpur, Nagpur , 
Patna, Sholapur, Ulhasnagar, 
Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada 
Asansol, Durgapur , Guntur , 
Guwahati, Kolhapur , Nasik, 
Ranchi, Sangli, Thane, Warangal 
Note: This table classifies into 8 distinct categories of treatment status the cities 
where the ULCRA had been effective until the federal repeal in 1999. Ceiling limits 
are based on the population size of the cities in 1970 census . Status of the ULCRA is 
as of the end of the sample of our empirical analysis, that is 2004. 
Table 2.4: 
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Impacts of Repealing the ULCRA on Secured Borrow-
ings for Full Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Repeal 0.021 0.102 0.131 0.060 
(0.066) (0.241) (0.400) (0.389) 
Repeal x In W -0 .026 0.125 0.222 
(0.065) (0.923) (1.060) 
Repeal x w 0.425*** 0.175 0.391* 
(0.155) (0.217) (0.233) 
Repeal x In W x w -0 .099 -0.088 
(0.062) (0.095) 
Repeal X In W 2 -0.084 -0.121 
(0.419) (0.492) 
Observations 13,044 13 ,044 13 ,044 13,044 
R2 0.025 0.038 0.036 0.038 
Number of Firm 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of 
the deregulation effect on secured borrowings. All specifications 
include the firm fixed effects and the year fixed effects. All the 
relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regres-
sors of the interactions are included. ln W is the log of the 1990 
level of collateralizable assets (Land, Building & Machineries), w 
is the 1990 level of the observed land share. All the monetary 
value is in unit of 10 million Indian Rupees (or 1 Crore Rs.), and 
deflated at the March 2003 Wholesale Price Index. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the state-level. *** p < O.Ol , ** p < 0.05, * 
p < O.l. 
Table 2.5: Impacts of Repealing the ULCRA on Secured Borrowings for Firms in A-cities & 
Others 
A-cities B,C,D-cities 
(1} (2} (3} (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Repeal 0.048 -0.419*** -0.483*** -0.569*** 0.036 0.080 0.260 0.230 
(0.051) (0.010) (0 .024) (0.008) (0.095) (0.178) (0.391) (0.401) 
Repeal x In W 0.133*** 0.901 *** 0.966*** -0.033 -0.653 -0.902 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.039) (0 .110) (1.320) (1.546) 
Repeal x w 0.590** 0.217** 0.532*** 0.979*** 0.639 1.116*** 
(0.071) (0.096) (0.074) (0 .209) (0.794) (0.301) 
Repeal x In W x w -0.147*** -0.122*** -0 .175 -0.223 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.394) (0.411) 
Repeal X In W 2 -0.386*** -0.404*** 0.283 0.421 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.625) (0 .740) 
Observations 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 4,850 4,850 4,850 4,850 
R2 0.824 0.827 0.826 0.827 0.784 0.792 0.791 0.792 
Number of Firm 629 629 629 629 382 382 382 382 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on secured borrowings. All specifications include the firm 
fixed effects and the year fixed effects. All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the interactions are included. 
In W is the log of the 1990 level of total collateralizable assets (Land, Building & Machineries), w is the 1990 level of the observed land share. All 
the monetary value is in unit of 10 million Indian Rupees (or 1 Crore Rs.), and deflated at the March 2003 Wholesale Price Index. Standard errors 
are clustered at the state-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check : Diffe rence-in-Differ ences Estimates w ith State-Trend for Fir ms in 
A-Cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (ll) 
Repeal 0.048 -0.098*** -0.419*** -0.596*** -0.410*** -0.483*** -0.662*** -0 .457*** -0.569*** -0.743*** -0.549*** 
(0.051) (0.008) (0.010) (0.038) (0.021) (0.024) (0.055) (0.032) (0.008) (0.029) (0.028) 
Repeal x ln W 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.024** 0.901 *** 0.887*** 0.758*** 0.966*** 0.958*** 0.813*** 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.019) (0.011) (0.039) (0.051) (0.043) 
Repeal x w 0.590*** 0.610*** 1.249*** 0.217** 0.253*** 0.836*** 0.532*** 0.553*** 1.186*** 
(0.071) (0.030) (0.179) (0.096) (0.060) (0.107) (0.074) (0.032) (0.176) 
Repeal x ln W x w -0.147*** -0.140*** -0.136*** -0.122*** -O.ll5*** -0.111 *** 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
Repeal x ln W 2 -0.386*** -0.377*** -0.369*** -0.404*** -0.398*** -0.383*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
Observations 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 8,194 
R2 0.824 0.825 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 -;J I-' 
Number of Firm 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Trend No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State Trend x ln W No No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
State Trend x w No No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on secured borrowings. Columns (1), (3), (6), 
and (9) are reproduction of the previous Table 2.5 . All other columns include state-trends. Columns (5), (8), and (11) further include the state-trend 
interacted with the initial firm assets to control for the differential trends across states based on initial asset values. All specifications include the firm 
fixed effects and the year fixed effects. All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the interactions are included. 
In W is the log of the 1990 level of collateralizable assets (Land, Building & Machineries), w is the 1990 level of the observed land share. All the 
monetary value is in unit of 10 million Indian Rupees (or 1 Crore Rs .) , and deflated at the March 2003 Wholesale Price Index. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Table 2.7: Falsification Test of Statistical Association between Pre-
Trends and Deregulation 
Dependent Var. Secured Borrowing Land Transaction 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A : Growth Rates between 1990 and 1998 
Repeal 0.083 -0.400** -0.056 
(0.120) (0.178) (0.039) 
Lag in Yrs 0.262*** 
Observations 
R2 
738 
0.001 
(0.081) 
738 
0.010 
589 
0.005 
Panel B : Growth Rates between 1992 and 1998 
Repeal 0.088 -0.170 -0.041 
(0.087) (0.140) (0.033) 
Lag in Yrs 0.141 ** 
(0.059) 
Observations 
R2 
1,115 
0.001 
1,115 
0.004 
915 
0.002 
Panel C : Growth Rates between 1994 and 1998 
Repeal 0.085 -0.024 -0. 042** 
(0.070) (0.114) (0.016) 
Lag in Yrs 0.060 
Observations 
R2 
1,904 
0.001 
(0.050) 
1,904 
0.002 
1,384 
0.002 
Panel D : Growth Rates between 1996 and 1998 
Repeal 0.016 -0.018 -0.024 
(0.021) (0.042) (0.014) 
Lag in Yrs 0.019 
Observations 
R2 
2,605 
0.000 
(0.023) 
2,605 
0.000 
2,360 
0.001 
-0.104 
(0.078) 
0.026 
(0.031 ) 
589 
0.006 
-0.032 
(0.036) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
915 
0.002 
-0 .023 
(0.040) 
-0.010 
(0.026) 
1,384 
0.002 
-0 .055** 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
2,360 
0.001 
Note: This table falsifies the statistical association between t he pre-treatment growth rates of secured 
b orrowings and land and t he adoption and timing of the land deregulation. This table shows the estimates 
of regressing the pre-treatment growth of firms' credit and land on the deregulation decisions made by the 
state governments. Panel A through D use the different spans of th e sample periods. P anel A uses the 
Growth rates between 1990 and 1998, the year before the federal repeal of the land regulation . Panel B, C 
and D use the growth rates between 1992 and 1998 , b etween 1994 and 1998, and b etween 1996 and 1998. 
Repeal takes on a value of one if the state a firm belongs to is a deregulation state, and zero otherwise. 
LaginY r s is t he lag in years of the state adoption of the land deregulation since the federal decision. Sample 
consists of firms in both treatment and control states, which include t hree Union Territories (Ch adingarh, 
Delhi and Pondicherry) where t he treatment status is subject to the decision by the state of Haryana and 
Punjub. Dependent variables are the differences in log of secured borrowings, and an indicator whether a 
firm is a net land trader (either buyer or seller). Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** p<0.01 , 
** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
Table 2.8: A verage-Liquidirty Impacts of Repealing the ULCRA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample Full Full A-cities A-cities B-cities B-cities C-cities C-cities D-eities D-eities 
Panel I : Land Transaction (Buying or Selling) 
Repeal -0.001 0.000 0.021 *** 0.022*** 0.042* 0.038* 0.014 0.013 0.044* 0.041 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) 
R2 0.047 0.053 0.042 0.049 0.052 0.069 0.065 0.095 0.075 0.099 
Panel II : Buying Probability 
Repeal -0.001 0.001 0.009*** 0.011 *** 0.039* 0.032* 0.023 0.025 0.049* 0.046 
(0.012) (0.012) (0 .002) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) 
R2 0.058 0.065 0.050 0.058 0.059 0.078 0.091 0.125 0.087 0.11 1 
Panel III : Selling Probability 
Repeal -0 .000 -0.001 0.012*** 0.011 *** 0.003 0.006 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) --J w 
R2 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.022 0.021 0.034 0.014 0.038 0.015 0.034 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry FE 
x Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 61,942 61,373 36,988 36,723 13,331 13,100 6,374 6,339 5,249 5,211 
Number of Firm 10,025 9,911 6,192 6,147 2,099 2,045 972 965 762 754 
Note: This table shows the estimates of the difference-in-differences estimation with three distinct outcome variables: Dependent 
variable is an indicator of whether a firm participates in either side of the land market (i.e. either buyer or seller) in Panel I, an 
indicator of whether a firm is a net buyer of land in Panel II, and an indicator of whether a firm is a net seller of land in Panel III . 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state-level. Column (1) and (2) includes firms in A, B, C and D cities in both treatment 
and control states. Column (3) and (4) uses only firms in A cities (mega cities), and so on. Columns of even numbers include the 
time-varying industry fixed effects as the other regressors. Industries are classified at the 1-digit level NIC classification. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Chapter 3 
Land Property Rights, Firm 
Productivity and Resource 
Reallocation in Urban India 
Abstract : This chapter uses the same data set to examine the effects of the deregulation 
on productivity and resource allocation across firms and industries of manufacturing sector. 
First , I construct a measure of productivity index at the firm and the aggregate level, and 
estimate the effect of the deregulation on productivity and on share of sales. I find that 
firm productivity increased for productive firms, while it decreased for unproductive firms. 
Resources are reallocated from less to more productive firms. As a result , aggregate pro-
ductivity of treatment states rose owing to the dispersed productivity distribution and the 
resource reallocation among firms. Additional regressions suggest that market competition 
generated these differential effects on firm productivity. 
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3.1 Introduction 
What are impacts of securing private property rights on investment and productivity? Pro-
viding exclusive rights to use and transfer properties could spur incentives to make invest-
ments and to improve productivity. Restrictions of these property rights create transaction 
costs in property markets , and hinder incentives to transfer properties through markets and 
to use them in production. This may be one of the most fundamental obstacles that firms 
or households have to overcome in developing economies. 
In this chapter, I empirically study the impacts on Indian firms ' productivity and allo-
cation of resources in the economy of securing private property rights of real estate (land 
and building), by empirically relying on a plausibly exogenous variation in the status of 
land regulation achieved by a series of repealing the ULCRA by state governments of In-
dia. First , I construct measures of productivity index both at firm and aggregate levels, 
from an estimation of parameters of production functions, and examine the evolutions of 
aggregate productivity. In particular, I decompose aggregate productivity into average firm 
productivity and a measure of efficiency of resource allocation among firms. Secondly, us-
ing a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I empirically estimate the effect of the 
land deregulation on the constructed firm productivity index and on resource allocation at 
the firm level. I examine the estimated effects on firms of different characteristics to infer 
implications for aggregate productivity. 
First , I construct two productivity measures, firm productivity and aggregate produc-
tivity, by using the estimated parameters of industry-specific production functions using 
the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 1 The measure of aggregate produc-
1 For the sake of conprehensive treatment of industries, I focus on industries in the manufacturing sector 
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tivity is calculated for both treatment and control groups as the averaged firm productivity 
weighted by firms' shares of sales to the total sales in the groups. It is then decomposed, 
as in Olley and Pakes (1996), Pavcnik (2002) and many others, to (1) the unweighted ag-
gregate productivity and (2) the covariance between firm productivity and shares of sales , 
to see how each of these measures evolve over time. I show that aggregate productivity is 
lower than the unweighted average of firm productivity since less productive firms represent 
larger shares of output markets. 
Next, I estimate the effect of the land deregulation on firm productivity, using a difference-
in-differences regression framework. I find that the land deregulation did not increase the 
level of firm productivity on average. But there is a substantial heterogeneity in the effects 
between productive and unproductive firms, and the dispersion of productivity becomes 
wider between these firms: productive firms become more productive, while unproductive 
firms become less productive. I find that the effects on productivity are largely driven by 
firms in mega cities where the regulation was most stringent and where there are a large 
share of observations of firms in the data. 
I also estimate the effect on share of sales, and find that shares were reallocated from 
incumbent firms to entrant firms, and from unproductive firms to productive firms. Com-
bining these two results, resources were redistributed to more productive firms, improving 
efficiency of allocation in the economy as a whole. 
I then explore the mechanism through which these effects were generated: impacts of 
the reform on market competition. The hypothesis is that market competition in industry 
induces firms to improve productivity, and that it also induces the resources to be reallocated 
because of the availability. of consistent industry-level price deflators. 
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to more productive producers. The idea of competition inducing productivity improvement 
and resource reallocation is not new. The recent literature of international trade both 
theoretically and empirically studies how the competition induced by trade liberalizations 
select firms to operate in an exporting market or a domestic market, and reallocate resources 
toward more productive users (Melitz (2003) and Pavcnik (2002)). There is also a strand 
of research that study how competition increases productivity (Amiti and Konings (2007) 
and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)). 
The relevant argument in the case of the Indian land deregulation is that the deregu-
lation facilitates entry of new and productive firms. The land regulation restricted firms' 
investment in a capital accumulation process directly through the imposed transaction costs 
of real estate properties, and indirectly through restrictions on credit access induced by 
lowered collateralizability of land. Once the restrictions are repealed owing to the land 
deregulation, it becomes easier or possible to adjust capital portfolio (machineries and real 
estate), to replace old and unproductive real estate or machineries to more productive ones, 
and to access a better loan contract with a larger size of loans with lower interest rates, etc. 
Moreover, it can increase entry due to a lowered obstacle in terms of transaction costs as 
well as fixed costs of entry. A market can become competitive when many firms participate 
in markets, and when a large part of market sales is shared equally by participating firms. 
There is a strand of literature that estimates the impacts of securing private property 
rights. Existing studies consistently find that more secure property rights cause higher in-
come per-capita [Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)], induce more investment [Besley 
(1995), Goldstein and Udry (2008) , Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) , Hornbeck (2010), 
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002)], and reallocate resources to a more productive 
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use [Field (2007), Wang (2011), Wang (forthcoming)]. 2 . This chapter distinguishes it-
self from the previous studies by discussing inter-firm as well as intra-firm reallocation of 
resources and the implication for the aggregate productivity. 
This paper also relates to the emerging literature on capital misallocation. Restuccia 
and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) are among the first attempts in the 
macroeconomics literature to shed light on the impact that resource misallocation has on 
income differences. Banerjee and Munshi (2004) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005) are among 
the first attempts to address this issue in the micro-development field. 3 To my knowledge, 
this chapter is the first attempt to examine a regulation of one of essential capital inputs 
and its impacts on capital composition and productivity. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows . Section 2 explains the dataset I use in 
the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy of estimating production 
functions and of constructing measures of productivity, and discusses the patterns of ag-
2Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find that Argentinian program of land titling during 1990s resulted in 
an increase in housing investment and child education, but did not find an increase in credit access of entitled 
households. Field (2007) finds that the Peruvian program of land titling induces the entitled households 
to reallocate their productive resources from home production to wage employment, but in a related study, 
Field and Torero (2006) find that the program did not increase the access to credit from private banks , 
while it increased the access to credit from the public banks. Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (forthcoming) 
critically argue that the competition in the credit market contributes positively to the impact of improving 
property rights. Wang (forthcoming) finds that the Chinese housing reform allowed households to finance 
their entrepreneurial activities by capitalizing on the value of the housing properties that they had rented 
from the state but purchased at subsidized prices. Similarly, Hornbeck (2010) find that the introduction of 
the barbed wire fences in the late 19th century led to increases in land improvement, land values, and the 
productivity and production share of crops most in need of protection, suggesting that the farmers' increased 
ability to protect their land from encroachment gives them opportunities to shift their resources to more 
productive uses. See Besley and Ghatak (2010) for the extensive review of the literature 
3 There are recent developments in this literature that investigate more detailed relationship between 
capital misallocation and aggregate productivity, and the mechanisms behind the two. Collard-Wexler, 
Asker and De Loecker (2011) are the recent attempt that connects capital misallocation and the aggregate 
productivity. Midrigan and Xu (2010) are the closest to this chapter in spirit, who study the role of financing 
in creating capital misallocation, although they do not examine the distortion created in neighboring land 
markets. Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011 ) and Moll (2010) are other examples that theoretically study the 
link between external financing and capital misallocation, and calibrate the model using an establishment-
level panel dataset . 
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gregate productivity. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy of estimating the impacts 
of the land deregulation on productivity and resource allocation. Section 5 shows the re-
sults of estimation, and discuss the potential mechanism of market competition. Section 6 
concludes. 
3.2 Data 
I use a panel dataset of Indian firms, from the Prowess database by the Center for Monitoring 
of Indian Economy ( CMIE). I use the data on the manufacturing sector, for the period 1991 
through 2007. 
I use a sample of firms that are in either treatment states or control states. The ten 
treatment states repealed the land regulation in or after 1999, whereas the five control states 
kept the regulation throughout the sample period over 1991-2007. Detail of the timing of 
the repeal of the land regulation is summarized in Table 3.1. The year 2007 is chosen as the 
end of the sample period, because states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra repealed the 
regulation in the year 2008, but my dataset does not have a sufficient number of observations 
in and after the year 2008. I exclude firms located outside the 61 cities targeted by the land 
regulation, since those firms are not affected by both the regulation and deregulation. I use 
the year 1991 as the base year of my variables of firm characteristics as defined below. The 
base year 1991 is eight years before the land regulation is repealed. 
Since the land (de)regulation relates to specific cities and states, it is critical to know the 
locations of firms' production and real estate. Unfortunately, however, the Prowess database 
does not provide detailed information on the exact locations of their production as well as 
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the locations of the real estate.4 Therefore, I assume that firms ' production and real estate 
are located in the same city as the registered office address reveals. 
Capital stock is composed of real estate (land and building) and plant and machinery. 
For all these types of capital stock, I use the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). Expenses 
to Raw Materials are used as the measure of materials, and Expenses to Power, Fuel and 
Water are used as the measure of power and fuel. I use Total Payments to Labor to construct 
the measure of labor, combined with the relevant wage data constructed from the Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI). All the monetary values of these variables are deflated using the 
relevant series of the Wholesale Price Index at the price of the year 2005. The details of 
the variable construction is provided in the data appendix. Finally, Repeal is an indicator 
variable that takes on a value of one if the land deregulation is adopted or effective in the 
state a firm locates, and zero otherwise. 
To obtain accurate measures of firms' gross output, I use the industry-specific Wholesale 
Price Index at up to the 4--digit industry classification (NIC) to deflate firms' sales (or 
revenue). Due to the availability of the output prices , the analysis of this chapter focuses on 
the manufacturing sector. There are 22 industries at the 2-digit level in the manufacturing 
sector. 
4 Although the Prowess database provides some information, including locations of land and buildings , 
at the plant level, I do not use that information for the following reasons. First, it is only for listed firrns , 
which comprise 27% of the total number of firms in the Prowess database, t hat provide plant-level data. 
Second, the segmentation of the business is left to the discretion of firms , still leaving ambiguous what part 
of land and buildings are located in the regulation areas. 
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3.3 Estimation of Productivity and Resource Allocation 
3.3.1 Production Function Estimation and Productivity Measures 
I estimate the production function of the Cobb-Douglas form 
(3.1) 
where mit is the log of stock of machinery, bit is the log of stock of real estate capital (land 
and building) , lit is the efficiency unit of labor hours , and eit is the material expenses. 
Capital stock is the state variable, while labor and material are variable inputs that can be 
adjusted every period. I estimate parameters of production function to analyze the effect 
of the land deregulation on productivity and on the firms' input distortions . 
As the vast literature on estimating production functions emphasizes, the first-order 
challenge is that the choice of the variable inputs may be driven by concurrent productivity 
shocks, which on the other hand directly affect the output levels. 5 To the extent that the 
positive productivity shocks cause increases in variable inputs and output together, the 
coefficients on the variable inputs embed upward simultaneity biases. Following Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), I assume that the productivity shock can 
be decomposed to 
Eit = Wit + T/it, (3.2) 
where Wit is a transitory productivity shock observed by firms, but not by econometricians, 
5 Syverson (2011) reviews the vast literature of productivity studies in recent empirical Industrial Orga-
nization. Olley and Fakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) are the methods extensively used in the 
studies of productivity. Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) and Wooldridge (2009) critically argue these 
two papers, and propose new methodologies to efficiently estimate the parameters of production functions . 
De Loecker (2011) develops a new empirical method to estimate productivity, which, controlling for unob-
served prices thereby separating price effects from demand shocks, gives rise to a surprisingly small effect on 
productivity of a reduction in trade barrier, from 8% under the conventional method to 2% under the new 
method. 
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and 'rJit is a random productivity shock that is not observed by firms nor by econometricians. 
Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , I use material expenses eit as a proxy for the 
concurrent productivity shocks to identify coefficients on variable inputs and state variables. 
This approach provides us consistent estimates of the parameters of production functions . I 
estimate parameters of production function separately by industry at the two-digit National 
Industrial Classification (NIC) , assuming that firms in the same industry deploy reasonably 
similar production technology so that the estimated parameters are allowed to vary across 
industries. 
The measure of productivity I use in this paper is constructed from a difference between 
the predicted sales and the actual sales, the conventional measure that is often used in 
the literature. In order to compare productivity across industries, the nominal productivity 
measure is normalized by subtracting the reference firm's productivity level, which is defined 
for each industry in the base year 1991.6 The reference firm of an industry is defined as a 
firm that has the mean values of log of inputs employed by firms in that industry in the 
base year. That is, my productivity index is the log of productivity of a firm in a given 
industry minus the log of productivity of the reference firm in the same industry in the 
base year. More formally, the productivity of firm i in industry j in year t is given in the 
following equation: 
where yf is the industry j's mean output in the base year , and yf is the predicted value of 
the industry j 's output using the estimated parameters (f3j' s for input z) and the industry 
6 This method is used by Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001) , Pav~nik (2002), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) 
and others . 
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mean of logs of inputs. This productivity measure presents a log deviation of a firm from 
the mean industry productivity in the base year. 
3.3.2 Aggregate Productivity and Its Decomposition 
This subsection argues the patterns of aggregate productivity during the sample period 
using the measure of firm productivity constructed in the previous subsection, and provides 
a motivation for our regression analyses that follow. 
Aggregate productivity is defined as a sales weighted mean of fum productivity, and it 
can be decomposed as the sum of unweighted aggregate productivity and the covariance of 
TFP and the share of sales. Covariance terms include the covariance of an industry's average 
TFP and the share of aggregate output, and the weighted average of the covariance of a 
firm's TFP and the share of the same industry's sales. More formally, it can be expressed 
as follows: 
Wt L Sjt L SijtPijt 
j 
Pt + L (Sjt - St)(Pjt- Pt) + L Sjt L(Sijt - Sjt)(Pijt- Pjt) 
j j 
P, + { C ovi ( S;,, P;t) + zt S;t · Cmi( St;t, Pt;t) } , (3.4) 
where Pijt is productivity of firm i in industry j in year t, Sjt = L i Yijt/ L j Li Yijt, and 
Sijt = Yijt! L i Yijt · An upper bar over a variable denotes the mean of that variable over the 
set of firms corresponding to the subscript (cf: jt for industry-year cells). The first term 
is the unweighted aggregate productivity, and the next two terms in the brackets are the 
covariances at the industry level and at the firm level. 
Table 3.7 shows the differential trends of decomposed aggregate productivity by treat-
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ment status. Panel A shows the transition of productivity levels over time, whereas Panel 
B lists the cumulated growth rate of productivity relative to the base year 1991. Note that 
the firm productivity index is normalized by the industry-specific median productivity level 
in the base year 1991. Negative values of aggregate productivity imply that a large share of 
total sales in the treatment or control group is represented by firms with lower productivity 
than the median firm in the same industry. Positive values of covariance terms indicate the 
contribution of resource reallocation across firms to aggregate productivity. When covari-
ance terms are positive, more output is produced by more productive firms or industries. 
Note that although market shares are taken care of within each of the treatment and con-
trol groups, its reallocation between groups is not taken into account. To the extent that 
reallocation occurs within each group, we observe such effects in this table. 
Panel A shows that aggregate productivity are negative while unweighted means of 
productivity are positive, since less productive firms represent larger share of the total sales. 
The treatment and control groups have this pattern in common. The negative level and 
trend of aggregate productivity suggest that less productive firms than the 1991 industry 
median firm continue to have larger shares of resources throughout the sample period. 
Panel B shows the cumulative growth rates of aggregate productivity, unweighted-mean 
productivity and the covariance term in a given year from the ba.Se year 1991. First, 
although the level of aggregate productivity was consistently negative in Panel A, it grew 
for the 17 years of the sample period: the aggregate productivity increased by 37% in the 
treatment states, while only by 7.6% in the control states. Second, the unweighted mean 
of productivity grows at the same rate over the sample period in both groups of states. 
Third, growth of aggregate productivity is largely dampened by a regressive reallocation of 
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resources (and market share of outputs) from more productive firms to less productive firms. 
It is evident that although the regressive reallocation shows similar patterns in the treatment 
and control states before the 1999 land deregulation, it diverges after the deregulation: in 
the later period, it grew in the treatment states, while it continues to decline in the control 
states. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
3.4.1 Identification Strategy and Endogeneity of Land Deregulation 
In this subsection, I estimate parameters of production function , construct the productivity 
index measure using the estimated parameters, and discuss whether the implementation of 
the land deregulation is reasonably exogenous to the potential outcomes of productivity of 
firms. 
First, I test the statistical association between the pre-deregulation growth rate of pro-
ductivity at the firm-level and the states' adoption of the land deregulation in the later 
period. Table 3.4 shows the results. Using the full sample of firms in the pre-deregulation 
period, column (1) of Table 3.4 shows a small and insignificant association between the 
two. Although the growth rate of machinery has a slight correlation with states ' adoption 
decision, its magnitude is small and other firm characteristics are insignificant. 
In a similar vein, I further test whether states' decision to adopt the land deregulation 
were driven by productivity of firms located in the state the year prior to the reform. 
In particular, this test takes into account the variation in timing of the adoption of the 
deregulation. I regress the Repeal variable, which takes on a value of one if the state that a 
firm is located deregulates the land market, and zero otherwise, on the sales-weighted state 
average of firm productivity in the year before. Results are reported in Table 3.5. When 
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using the full sample, the estimate is positive and insignificant. To address the possibility 
that the early deregulation states are different from the late deregulation states, I focus on 
the treatment group, and ask whether the deregulation decision reflects productivity in the 
previous years. In column (2) , the estimate is negative and insignificant. Hence, we see 
no evidence of any statistically significant association of the timing of the reform and firm 
characteristics. 
3.4.2 Deregulation Impact on Productivity 
The empirical strategy of this chapter uses a variation in the status of the land (de )regulation 
across states and years to identify its effect on productivity. The baseline regression is 
conducted in the following specification: 
Prist = (3Repeal st +As + cl>t + Eist , (3.5) 
where f3 is the coefficient of interest, As and cl>t are a set of state and year fixed effects. Year 
fixed effects control for macroeconomic shocks that affect all firms in a similar manner, and 
state fixed effects control for state-level policies that attempt to promote higher productivity 
of firms in the states. To account for the possibility that there are unobservable time-
invariant firm-specific factors correlated with the timing of the reform, I include firm fixed 
effects Ci , instead of state fixed effects As , in some specifications. 
Besides identifying the average effects on productivity, our main aim in this section is to 
estimate any differential effects with respect to firms' initial productivity. I also first look at 
differential effects with respect to the timing of firms' market entry. Or, more specifically, 
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I estimate the following equation: 
(3.6) 
where Di is a dummy indicating whether a firm entered after 1991. I chose the year 1991 
as the threshold year first because it is our first year in the sample, and secondly because 
India experienced a series of liberalization from early 1990's and thus entrants during or 
after the liberalization period are expected to be more productive than their incumbents 
as well as the entrants in the previous periods. Therefore, our estimate of 1/J ought to be 
positive in our OLS regression specification. Moreover, to the extent that entrants after 
1991 and their incumbents changed their productivity in a systematic way, we will obtain 
different estimates in signs and values for (3 and I· 
In a similar vein, I next examine differential effects with respect to the initial produc-
tivity of firms, defined as the TFP index in 1991. Therefore, this regression exercise focuses 
on the sample of firms that already existed in 1991: 
(3. 7) 
where Prf1 is a firm 's productivity index in 1991. Choice of the year 1991 is due to the 
same reason as in the case for the entrants. We expect~ to be positive owing to persistence 
of firm productivity over time. The estimate 1 in this specification captures the effect of 
the land deregulation on the distribution of firm productivity. A negative (resp . positive) 
sign of 1 shows that the reform reduced (resp. increased) dispersion of productivity across 
firms. 
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3.4.3 Deregulation Impact on Firms' Share of Production 
In this subsection, I examine the deregulation impact on the market share of firms. The 
market share is defined as the ratio of a firm 's sales to the total sales in the treatment or 
control group to which the firm belongs in a given year. I use this measure because we 
need to capture the differential effects across firms of different characteristics, especially 
productivity, rather than to capture the effect on the treatment firms relative to unaffected 
control firms 7 . As became evident from the previous section outlaying the patterns of 
aggregate productivity and resource allocation between the treatment and control groups, 
there is a possibility that resource allocation became substantially more efficient at the 
aggregate level, not just at the narrowly defined industry level in the treatment group after 
the land deregulation. Therefore, the share index as defined above provides insights into 
aggregate resource reallocation, rather than resource reallocation within narrowly defined 
industries. 
Using the full sample of firms, the firms ' sales share within each group is regressed on the 
Repeal variable and its interaction with a dummy for entrants after 1991. This regression 
allows us to infer how resources were reallocated across old and new firms in the treatment 
states. In the following equation, 
Sist = f3 R epealst + '1/J Di + 1 (Repealst * Di) + q>t + Eist, (3.8) 
where Sist is the share of firm i in state s in year t and Di is a dummy indicating whether 
7!£ we are interested in the following , we could use an alternative measure of the market share, which is, 
for example, the ratio of a firm's sales to the total sales of the industry it belongs. To the extent that the 
market share moves from the control to treatment firms, the treatment effects on this measure of the market 
share should be estimated positive. Although using this measure also allows us to examine the differential 
effects among the treatment firms, using my measure provides more direct evidence of resource reallocation. 
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a firm entered the markets after 1991, the signs of the estimates of the coefficients f3 and 
1 indicate the direction to which the sales shares move. We expect to obtain a positive 
estimate of 1 to the extent that the shares reallocate from old firms to new firms. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Effect on Productivity 
In this subsection, I estimate effects of the reform on average firm productivity and its 
dispersion. Panel A in Table 3.9 uses the full sample of firms and examines the effects 
on firms entering after 1991, while Panel B uses a sub-sample of firms that existed in the 
base year 1991. The dependent variable is the difference in firm productivity compared 
with 1991. First, column (1) of Panel A indicate that there is no effect on average firm 
productivity. In column (2) , adding the late-entrant dummy confirms that they are indeed 
more productive than those firms existing in 1991. Estimates suggest that latecomers are on 
average about 25% more productive. Although the deregulation effects on the latecomers 
do not appear to be significantly positive in column (3) , the estimates become statistically 
significant after controlling for firm fixed effects in column (5). In these columns, the 
estimates indicate that the effect on early entrants are negative in sign and statistically 
insignificant. Panel B examines further the differential effects on these early-entrant firms 
by adding the interaction between Repeal and the productivity index in 1991. The results 
suggest that there is no evidence of effects that vary by initial firm productivity. 
Similarly, Table 3.10 reports the estimates of the effects on firms located in mega cities 
where the regulation intensity was most stringent. As was the case for Chapter 2, the effect 
on these firms are much more significant than average firms in India: by comparing estimates 
from Table 3.9 , some estimates became statistically significant. In particular in column ( 4) 
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and (5), the average effect on old firms are on average negative and statistically significant, 
and the differential effect of productivity also turns out to be significantly positive. Notice 
that in the estimates in column (2) and (3) , late-entrant firms are on average 31 percent 
more productive than early-entrant firms. 
Therefore, these results suggested that firms that entered after 1991 are on average more 
productive than old firms , and productive firms that entered both before and after 1991 
increased firm productivity while old and unproductive firms decreased firm productivity. 
The distribution of firm productivity, therefore, became more dispersed as a result of the 
land deregulation. 
This result is intuitive because land regulation directly restricted firms ' investment and 
adjustment in capital accumulation process, and indirectly prohibited firms ' access to credit, 
as found in Chapter 2. Once the regulation was removed, firms that had growth potential 
took advantage of the opportunities to improve productivity, while firms that stayed active 
owing to the effective protection by the regulation faced tough competition in markets. 
Therefore, the negative impact on unproductive firms can be thought of as evidence of the 
general equilibrium effect of land deregulation. 
Next I attempt to corroborate these findings by examining whether and how the observed 
effects varied with regulation intensity. Table 3.11 shows the results of the regression of the 
same specification as Panel B of Table 3.9, but using the sub samples of firms decomposed 
by the regulation intensity. The ULCRA specified that the larger the city is , the smaller 
the ceilings in landholdings. Panel A of Table 3.11 uses the sample of firms located in mega 
cities where the ceiling limit was 500m2 . The estimates of the effect on the firms of the 
average productivity are consistently negative and significant across specifications , and the 
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estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term is positively significant. It suggests that 
only the most productive firms increased productivity, while unproductive firms decreased 
productivity in the mega cities. When the sample includes firms located in large and 
mega cities in Panel B where the ceiling limit was lower than 1000m2, the effect became 
smaller and less significant. The estimated coefficients on the interaction do not lose its 
magnitude in the specifications with firm fixed effects and are still significant. Finally, once I 
include firms in medium cities to the sample, the estimates of the differential effects became 
insignificant although the signs of the estimated coefficients are in line with Panel A and 
B. These results show that the effects vary with regulation intensity in a manner consistent 
with the hypothesis that the deregulation increased dispersion of productivity across firms . 
3.5.2 Effects on Sales Share of Firms 
To see how resources were reallocated among firm within the treatment states after the 
deregulation, I estimate the effect on the share of firms ' sales. Table 3.12 reports the results. 
The dependent variable, the sales share, is measured in percents. First , column (1) and (4) 
indicate that the share, on average, decreased by about 0.02%. This negative effect can be 
interpreted as the effect of the reform on entry of new firms taking shares from incumbents 
after the deregulation. The estimates in column (5) indicate that the effects significantly 
vary by timing of entry: the share of old firms fell by 0.05%, while the share of new firms 
increased by approximately the same magnitude (0.04%). Secondly, using the sample of old 
firms in Panel B, it turns out in column (5) that it is only old and unproductive firms that 
lost shares of sales after the deregulation. Old but productive firms actually increased their 
shares. Since late-entrant firms were more productive than old firms on average, it follows 
that the share of more productive firms increased. 
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Table 3.13 confirms that the resources were indeed reallocated from less productive 
firms to more productive firms, using the sample of firms located in mega cities where 
the productivity dispersion was observed. The estimates suggest that productive firms 
that increased firm productivity also gained sales shares , whereas unproductive firms that 
decreased firm productivity also lost shares. 
3.5.3 Mechanism: Market Competition 
The preceding results suggest that the reforms reduced concentration within industries. 
Since newly entering firms typically have smaller shares than incumbents, a reallocation 
in favor of new entrants would reduce industry concentration. To check this , I explore 
the effects directly on market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index. In this 
subsection, I examine the mechanism through which the heterogeneous effects on the TFP 
index arise. In particular, I explore the role of market competition in connecting the land 
deregulation to the effects on the TFP index, by using the Herfindahl index of markets for 
2-digit and 3-digit industry classifications. 
Table 3.14 summarizes the results. The first two columns use full sample of firms , 
while the next two columns use the sample of firms located in mega cities. The positive 
estimates of the coefficient on Repeal suggest that the reform on average increased firm 
productivity in least-concentrated markets. The negative estimates of the coefficient on the 
interaction of Repeal and the Herfindahl index suggest that as markets become concentrated, 
the deregulation impact on firm productivity becomes smaller, albeit positive. In highly-
concentrated industries, however , the estimates suggest that the deregulation caused firm 
productivity to decline. These effects are significantly estimated only in the sample of firms 
located in mega cities, but not in the full sample. 
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Next, I directly examine how market concentration changed after the deregulation in 
each type of industries. To study the effect on the market competition, I aggregate the 
firm-level data at the state-industry level. That is, the unit of observation is now state-
industry-year cells. Industries are stratified at the 3-digit level. Dependent variables are log 
number of firms entering and log number of active firms in each cell. The idea behind this 
aggregation is that the numbers of entry and active firms in each cell reflect the degree to 
which a firm in the same cell directly face competition, although confining our focus to these 
cells does not necessarily mean that the markets are segregated across states. My measure 
of market competition is based on the Herfindahl index constructed above. I include in 
the regression a dummy indicating whether a industry is highly-concentrated, rather than 
using the number of active firms in cells. The threshold level of Herfindahl index for the 
high concentration is at 75 percentile of the distribution. 
Table 3.15 reports the results. First , Repeal on average increased entry and the number 
of active firms. Repeal increased entries into the market by 22.5 percent. Since the average 
number of firms entering per year in the control states is 5.79, there are more than one 
firm on average entering narrowly-defined cells in the treatment states. Repeal on average 
increased the number of active firms in the market at the 3-digit industry level by 22.8 
percent. Since the average number of firms in the control states is 77.77 at the 3-digit 
industry level, there are about 17 more active firms operating in industry-state-year cells 
of the treatment states in the same 3-digit industry than in cells of the control states. 
Second, the industry average productivity did not affect entry, while it had a positive 
impact on the number of active firms. It is expected that a selection of entrants into the 
market becomes more severe when industry mean productivity is high. But the estimate 
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suggests that this did not happen as a result of the land deregulation. The estimate on 
the interaction term in column (2) is positive but statistically insignificant. By contrast, 
combined with the results on entry, the deregulation seems to have reduced exits in in-
dustries with higher average productivity. The estimate on the interaction term in column 
(5) suggests that a 10 percent increase in industry average productivity is associated with 
about one percent increase in the number of active firms. 
Third, the deregulation reduced entry in highly-concentrated industries while not af-
fecting the number of active firms. The estimates on the interaction term in column (3) 
suggest that these industries decreased entry by 21 percents, while competitive industries 
increased entry by about 30 percents. The estimates in column (7) suggest that combined 
with the results on entry, the reform induced fewer exits in highly-concentrated industries, 
as compared to the control group. Above all, the results suggest that market competition 
became less severe in highly-concentrated industries as a result of the deregulation, while 
it became much tougher in competitive industries. 
Overall, market competition became more intense for industries that are productive 
and competitive to begin with. Increased competition resulting from entry of new firms in 
turn explains why productive firms raised productivity as a way to survive in the market, 
whereas unproductive firms decreased productivity. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the quantitative effects on productivity and resource allocation 
of repealing the land ceilings and regulations that had restricted land transactions in urban 
India for the last quarter of the 20th century. The key findings of this chapter are as follows. 
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First, by decomposing into the unweighted mean of firm productivity and the covariance 
of firm productivity and sales share, aggregate productivity was found to be dragged down 
by a regressive resource reallocation among firms throughout the sample period. The land 
deregulation made the distribution of firm productivity more dispersed: initially productive 
firms became more productive, while unproductive firms became less productive. Secondly, 
there was a resource reallocation from unproductive to productive firms. As a result, the 
land deregulation changed the resource allocation to be more efficient at the aggregate 
level. Third, the market competition worked as a source of heterogeneous effects on firms 
of differing productivity levels. The estimated heterogeneous effects on firm productivity 
was found to be driven by the underling level of market concentration. The increase in 
firm productivity was most prominent in least concentrated industries. Lastly, the numbers 
of entry and active firms were also influenced largely by concentration in narrowly-defined 
markets. Entry and the number of active firms increased by most in less-concentrated 
markets, whereas highly-concentrated markets reduced entry. 
Limitations of this paper are in order. First, the dataset did not precisely locate each 
firms' landholdings. The precise level of firms ' exposure to the land deregulation may be 
more subtle than I assumed in this chapter: treatment firms may be less affected, whereas 
control firms may be somewhat affected. Since this possibility simply creates a downward 
bias in our estimates of the effect of the land deregulation, out estimates in this chapter 
should be regarded as lower bounds of the effects. Second, the lack of the input price data led 
me to rely on the input prices at the aggregate level, which may introduce measurement error 
in the measures of the absolute input distortions. It may also have created a measurement 
error in the constructed measures of the relative input distortion. 
3.A 
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Appendix: Resource Reallocation Driven by Real-Estate 
Demand 
Next, to see the mechanism through which the land deregulation increases firms' output 
in mega and large cities, I run the regression with a variable of the industry-level real 
estate ratio to the total capital. Industry-mean of the ratio of real estate to capital is 
interacted with Repeal. I expect that the higher the ratio , the bigger the exposure to 
the land regulation and hence potentially the more the inefficiency of capital composition 
and the smaller the output. To the extent this argument is valid, we ought to observe an 
increase in output. The results are summarized in Table 3.16 where Panel A uses log sales 
as the dependent varaible, and Panel B uses log capital. In Panel A, the magnitude and 
the significance of the estimates of the coefficient on repeal do not change much as I include 
the real estate ratio as another regressor in column (1), (4) and (7). The effects on firms 
in more real-estate intensive industry are significantly smaller than those on firms in less 
real-estate intensive industry. A 10% point increase in the industry mean real-estate ratio 
is associated with a 23% to 54% reduction in log sales in mega cities, suggesting that the 
land regulation had more real-estate intensive industries to operate at a larger scale than 
optimal, while the less intensive industries at a smaller scale. Column (3) and (6) include as 
an additional control the industry mean of log capital to control for the average size of firms 
in industries, which potentially is picked up by the real estate ratio . Inclusion of this control 
does not alter the magnitude and sign of the estiamates of the coefficients of interest. The 
heterogeneous effects are driven by capital adjustment, as indicated in Panel B. Although 
there is no average effect on capital, the heterogeneous effects on capital are similar to 
those on output . On the other hand, Panel B of Table 3.17 indicates that although some 
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specifications show significant heterogeneous effects on productivity, the estimates are not 
robustly significant throughout the specifications. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that the 
heterogeneous effects on the output are driven by the effects on productivity. 
I further investigate how the deregulation changed the stock of each of real estate and 
machinery. The results are shown in Table 3.18. The estimates of the heterogeneous 
effects with respect to the real-estate ratio are consistently negative in all specifications 
both when the dependent variable is real estate and when it is machinery. The positively 
significant estimates of the repeal variable imply that industries of lower real-estate ratio 
increase the stock of both types of capital after the deregulation. Thus , the results in 
this Table suggest that the land deregulation allowed a substantial capital reallocation 
across industries, especially from the real-estate intensive industries to the machine-intensive 
industries. ULCRA had effectively protected the real-estate intensive industries at a cost 
of potential growth of the machine-intensive industries. 
Similarly, there could be differential effects on firms of different real-estate ratios within 
the same industry. In particular, the question we are particularly interested is as to whether 
higher ratios of real estate to capital cause a differential effect on capital composition be-
tween real estate and machinery. To answer this question, I first look at the effects on each 
type of capital, then I directly look at the ratio of real estate compared to total capital. 
First, I include as another regressor a real-estate ratio at the firm-level that is demeaned 
by the industry average. By demeaning, the firm-level differential effects can be identified 
separately from the industry-level differential effects. Since the concurrent firm-level real-
estate ratios are simultaneously determined as the outcome variables, I use the values of 
the real-estate ratio both at firm and industry level from the base year. This regression can 
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also be a robustness check of the results in Table 3.18 as to whether our estimates picked 
up biases from the endogeneity. Column (1) , (4) and (5) of Table 3.19 indicate that the 
estimates in Table 3.18 are not driven by the concurrent ratios.8 Having higher real-estate 
ratios still have negative impacts on both plant and machinery and real estate when I use 
the base-year values of the industry real-estate ratios. Adding firm-level real-estate ratios 
as another control does not alter the signs of the estimates of the effect on plant and rna-
chinery. Although it takes away the significance of the heterogeneous effect of the industry 
real-estate ratio, the estimates become significant once I control for the firm fixed effects. 
After controlling for the heterogeneous effects by industry, the heterogeneous effects of the 
real-estate ratio across firms are estimated in column (3) and (6) . Although the sign of 
the effect on plant and machinery is negative in column (3) when OLS is used, it became 
positive once I control for the firm fixed effects. My fixed-effects estimation suggsts that a 
10% point increase (decrease) in the firm real-estate ratio is associated with a 4% increase 
(decrease) in plant and machinery as compared to the industry-average treatment effect. 
Similarly, a 10% point increase (decrease) in the firm real-estate ratio is associated with 
a 2.5% decrease (increase) in real estate as compared to the industry-average treatment 
effect. 
Table 3.20 summarizes the estimates of the effects on the real estate ratio. A higher 
real-estate ratio at the industry level is consistently associated with a positively larger 
treatment effect on the ratio, implying that the real-estate intensive industries, on average, 
increase the intensity of real estate in production. The results in Table 3.19 suggest that 
the real-estate intensive industries become more real-estate intensive by shedding more of 
8 Column (1 ) and (4) include firms entered after 1991, but the other columns include firms existing in 
1991. 
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machineries than real estate, whereas the machine-intensive industies become more machine 
intensive by acquiring more of machineries than real estate. Column (3) and (6) include an 
interaction term of repeal with the demeaned real-estate ratio of firms, which captures the 
effect of having higher real-estate ratios within the same industry. The negative estimates 
on this variable implies that the dispersion of capital composition between the real-estate 
intensive and non-intensive industries is driven a large part by real-estate scarce firms in 
the real-estate intensive industries and real-estate affluent firms in the machine-intensive 
industries. 
To check if these results simply reflect the treatment effect of firm-level real-estate ratio , 
rather than its demeaned values from the industry mean, I used absolute values of real-estate 
ratios at the firm level in column (7) of Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. The estimates suggest 
that the heterogeneous effects on both machinery and real estate with respect to firm real-
estate ratios are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, the firm-level variation in 
the real-estate ratio had effects on capital stock only locally around the industry effects, but 
not globally. In addition, Table 3.21 confirms that we do not observe heterogeneous effects 
of a firm real-estate ratio even if the industry real-estate ratios are not controlled for. 
Given the results on hand, although the effects are heterogeneous across firms of different 
real estate ratios in the same industry, the resources are reallocated only across industries, 
but not within industries. 
3.B Data Appendix 
3.B.l Variable Construction 
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Sales: Book value of sales for each firm is converted to real terms by dividng it by the 
Wholesale Price Index. The 3-digit level National Industry Classification (NIC) is matched 
with the product-level Wholesale Price Index. Due to the availability of price data, I ex-
cluded all firms that fall into sectors other than manufacturing. 
Labor: The expenditure on wages and salaries is converted into an efficiency unit of labor 
using a measure of wages estimated from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). Since the 
Prowess database only contains total payments to workers but not the number of workers 
employed by firms , I compute the annual average of wage rates from the ASI. I first divide 
the total emoluments by the total number of workers, and then divide it by 2000 working 
hours per person per year, assuming that each worker has 40 hours per week and 50 weeks 
a year. Next , dividing the expenditure on wages and salaries obtained from the Prowess 
by the estimated wage rate gives us a measure of hours of work per year deployed by each 
firm. 
Raw Materials: Raw material expenses are converted into real terms by dividing the 
expenses by the wholesale price index. 
Power, Fuel and Water: Power , fuel and water charges are converted into real terms by 
dividing the charges by the industry-specific wholesale price index for Fuel Power Light and 
Lubricants. 
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Capital: I employ the Perpetual Inventory Method to arrive at capital stock at replacement 
costs. In the analysis, I use two types of capital separately, namely land and building, and 
plant and machineries. First, I have to measure the initial capital stock for each type of 
capital in the year 1990. By assuming the life of buildings as 50 years and that of machineries 
as 20 years , book values of capital at year t at historic costs is 
where Pt, Kt , It are pnce, capital stock, investment at time t, 1r = 1ft = Pt/ Pt_ 1 and 
g = 9t =It/ It-1 , and T =50 for buildings and= 20 for machineries. For the last equality, I 
implicitly assume that before 1990, the growth rates of price for capital and growth rates of 
investments are constant at 1r and at g, respectively. Assumption of 20 years and 50 years of 
length of life for machinery and buildings is based on the various issues of 'National Accounts 
Statistics: Sources and Methods' from the Central Statistics Organization, Ministry of 
Statistics & Programme Implementation. 
Now, capital at historic costs is converted into capital at replacement costs by multiply-
ing it by the revaluation factor, which is defined as the ratio of the two. Using the definition 
of the value of capital at replacement costs, 
the revaluation factor is defined as 
vr=Rt = 1-(1/ gt+1 ng-1 
- H[ 1- (1/ ng)r+l ng- 1r 
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Growth rates of price for capital and investment before the initial year 1990 is arrived 
at in the following way. I use the Gross Capital Formation from the Central Statistical 
Office, both at current prices and at constant prices. By using the gross capital formation 
at constant price at year t, yf, the growth rate of investment is measured as 
Similarly, the growth rates of price for capital is obtained by using gross capital formation 
at current prices, y[, 
r / s Yt+l Yt+l 
1ft= y[jyf 
Pt+1It+l/J5It+l 
PtitfPit 
Applying the revaluation factor with the accordingly measured growth rates of the price and 
investment to the capital at historical costs, capital is converted into the one at replacement 
costs: R 90 = V 7 • Hg0 . Measures of the growth rates of price of capital, 1r , and the growth 
rates of investment in real estate and in plant and machinery, g, are calculated as above from 
a series of gross fixed capital formation in National Accounts Statistics (NAS), published 
by the Central Statistical Office ( CSO). 
Measure of g in a given year is calculated as an average growth rate of investment in 
construction and machinery over the previous five years. Growth rates of investment for 
construction and machinery are calculated from a series of gross fixed capital formation in 
NAS. Similarly, the measure of 1r in a given year is calculated as an average growth rate of 
prices for investments over the previous twenty years. 
Finally, the initial capital stock is converted into real terms, using the implied deflators 
computed by dividing capital stock at current prices by capital stock at constant prices. 
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The deflators used to compile the series of gross fixed capital formation are based on the 
index numbers of wholesale prices. I use the price indices for capital investment obtained 
from all institutions, which include private corporate sector, household sector and public 
sector. 
For our measure of real asset capital, I deflate the values of land as well as buildings by 
the imputed price index for construction, since there is no available price index for land. 
I assume that the price of land is reasonably correlated with the price of buildings. More 
important , land is assumed not to be depreciated over time. 
Perpetual Inventory Method implies 
where 0 is the depreciation rate. In order to obtain capital stock in the susequent years 
following the initial year, the deflated value of investment is added to the capital stock from 
the previous year. Following Balakrishnan, Pushpangadan and Basu (2000) and Topalova 
and Khandelwal (2011), I construct the gross value of capital stock, instead of the net value 
that takes into account the depreciation of subsequent years' investment. 
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Table 3.1: Timing of the Repal of the ULCRA by the State Gov-
ernments 
YEAR OF 
REPEAL 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
STATE 
Chandigarh, Delhi, Pondicherry, Punjub 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh 
Madhya Pradesh 
Rajasthan 
Orissa 
2008 Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra 
Not yet repealed Assam, Bihar, West Bengal 
Note: The ULCRA was repealed during the fiscal year that ends at the 
end of March of specified years. States of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Manipur, Meghlaya, Tripura had repealed the ULCRA at some points, but 
there were no urban agglomeration that falls in the categories A through 
D for which the land ceiling was in effect at the time of repeal. Among 
the earliest repealer states, Chandiharh, Delhi , and Pondicherry are the 
Union Territories and are directly governed by the federal government . 
Table 3.2: Ceiling Limits and Status of ULCRA 
ULCRA Repealed Not Repealed Yet 
Land Ceilings 
A Delhi 
500m2 
c 
!500m2 
D 
2000m2 
Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Kanpur 
Agra, Allahadad, Amritsar, Bareilly, 
Bhopal, Gwalior, Hubli-Dharwar, 
Indore, Jabalpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, 
Lucknow, Ludhiana, Meerut , 
Mysore, Rajkot, Surat, Vadodara, 
Varanasi 
Aligarh , Ajmer, Belgaum, 
Bhavanagar, Bikaner , Chandigarh, 
Cuttack, Dehraduri, Durg-
Bhilainagar, Jarnnagar, Gorakhpur, 
Jullundur , Kota, Mangalore, 
Moradabad, Nagpur , Pondicherry, 
Raipur , Saharanpur, Ujjain 
Kolkata, Mumbai 
Hyderabad, Pune 
Dhanbad, Jamshedpur, Nagpur, 
Patna, Sholapur , Ulhasnagar, 
Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada 
Asansol, Durgapur, Guntur, 
Guwahati, Kolhapur , Nasik, 
Ranchi, Sangli, Thane, Warangal 
Nate: This table classifies into 8 distinct categories of treatment status the cities 
where the ULCRA had been effective until the federal repeal in 1999. Ceiling limits 
are based on the population size of the cities in 1970 census. Status of the ULCRA is 
as of the end of the sample of our empirical analysis, that is 2004. 
Table 3.3: T wo-Digit I ndustry Classification of Manufacturing Sector 
Industry Mean S.D. Firm 
NIC Industry Names Productivity Productivity N 
15 Food Products and Beverages -1.413 0.828 1,511 
16 Tobacco Products 0.987 0.441 108 
17 Textiles 1.268 0.612 1,481 
18 Wearing Apparel 0.416 0.194 95 
19 Tanning and Dressing of Leather -2.186 1.124 48 
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork -1.234 0.199 64 
21 Paper and Paper Products 0.474 0.222 399 
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 1.752 0.534 158 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 1.329 0.215 120 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products -0.578 0.787 3,612 
I-' 
25 Rubber and Plastics Products -0 .282 0.389 759 0 CJl 
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products -1.022 0.734 852 
27 Basic Metals 0.882 0.261 1,407 
28 Fabricated Metal Products 3.077 0.757 552 
29 Machinery and Equipment -0.601 0.584 1,572 
30 Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery -1.099 0.686 78 
31 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 0.835 0.323 709 
32 Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 0.493 0.225 366 
33 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 2.256 0.578 107 
34 Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers 0.423 0.243 882 
35 Other Transport Equipment -2.508 0.577 132 
36 Furniture 0.786 0.139 103 
N ote: This table classifies the details of 2-digit industries in the manufacturing sector, based on the National Industry Classification (NIC) . 
Productivity measures are values in the base year 1991. Number of firms for each industry is counted in 1991. 
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Table 3.4: Pre-Deregulation Growth of Firm Outcomes and States' 
Adoption of Deregulation 
TFP index Capital Machinery Real Estate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.000 0.006 0.008* 0.004 
(0 .014) (0.004) (0 .005) (0.005) 
Observations 4,922 4,922 4,922 4,922 
Rz 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Note: This table shows the OLS estimate of the statistical association between the 
pre-deregulation growth rates of firms ' outcome variables and the state's adoption of 
the federal land deregulation. Unit of observation is firms . Different columns use 
different outcome variables. 
Table 3.5: Land Deregulation Endogeneity: Current Firm Out-
comes and Subsequent Deregulation 
Full Sample Treatment Group 
(1) (2) 
TFP index 0.004 -0.021 
(0.372) (0.020) 
Capital 0.128 -0 .003 
(0 .316) (0.003) 
Machinery 0.127 -0.001 
(0.172) (0 .007) 
Real Estate 0.061 0.000 
(0.550) (0 .002) 
Observations 31 ,218 12,006 
Note: Repeal variable is regressed on the previous year 's state-averaged outcome 
variables. Regression is weighted by the number of active firms in each state-year cell. 
Column (1) uses the full sample, whereas column (2) uses a subsample of firms located 
in treatment states. 
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Table 3.6: Pre-Deregulation Characteristics of Manufacturing Sec-
tor and States' Adoption of Deregulation 
Labor 
(1) (2) 
Xst -0.017 -0 .007 
(0.016) (0.012) 
Xst- 1 0.014 
(0.016) 
Xst-2 -0.020 
(0.019) 
Observations 14,438 8,038 
R2 0.012 0.009 
Sales 
(3) ( 4) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
14,438 
0.009 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
-0.023 
(0 .022) 
8,038 
0.007 
Real Estate 
(5) (6) 
-0 .008 
(0.009) 
14,119 
0.006 
-0 .011 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
7,879 
0.004 
Note: This table shows the estimates of the effect of the pre-deregulation characteris-
tics of firms on the future treatment status of the states. Sample consists of observations 
before the federal deregulation in 1999. Dependent variable is an indicator of whether 
a state to which a firm belongs adopts the federal land deregulation in the later period. 
Each column uses as independent variables the state mean of log of the gross labor , 
the gross revenue, the real estate capital in the 2005 Wholesale Price Index. Columns 
of even numbers add up to two-year lags of the independent variable, Xst· 
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth 
Treatment States Control States 
Aggregate Unweighted Aggregate Unweighted 
TFP TFP Covariance TFP TFP Covariance 
Panel A : Level Decomposition of Productivity Index 
1991 -0 .535 0.017 -0.552 -0.397 -0.009 -0.388 
1992 -0.529 0.083 -0.613 -0.351 0.049 -0.400 
1993 -0.524 0.102 -0.627 -0.340 0.070 -0.410 
1994 -0.378 0.183 -0 .560 -0.303 0.162 -0.465 
1995 -0 .352 0.234 -0 .586 -0.231 0.205 -0 .437 
1996 -0 .384 0.253 -0 .637 -0.279 0.188 -0.467 
1997 -0.287 0.270 -0.557 -0.311 0.205 -0.516 
1998 -0.370 0.227 -0 .597 -0.310 0.203 -0.513 
1999 -0.404 0.222 -0.627 -0.288 0.193 -0.482 
2000 -0.402 0.264 -0.666 -0.227 0.225 -0.452 
2001 -0.319 0.269 -0 .588 -0.137 0.227 -0.365 
2002 -0 .382 0.285 -0.667 -0.216 0.272 -0.488 
2003 -0.360 0.287 -0 .647 -0.197 0.289 -0.486 
2004 -0.371 0.275 -0 .646 -0.295 0.261 -0.556 
2005 -0 .228 0.285 -0 .513 -0 .283 0.285 -0.568 
2006 -0 .271 0.309 -0.580 -0.326 0.289 -0 .615 
2007 -0.165 0.326 -0.491 -0 .321 0.292 -0.614 
Panel B : Rate of Productivity Growth Relative to 1991 
1991 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1992 0.005 0.066 -0 .061 0.046 0.058 -0.011 
1993 0.010 0.085 -0.075 0.057 0.079 -0.022 
1994 0.157 0.166 -0.009 0.094 0.171 -0.077 
1995 0.183 0.217 -0 .035 0.166 0.214 -0 .048 
1996 0.150 0.236 -0 .085 0.118 0.197 -0.079 
1997 0.248 0.253 -0.006 0.086 0.214 -0 .128 
1998 0.165 0.210 -0.046 0.087 0.212 -0 .124 
1999 0.1 30 0.205 -0.075 0.109 0.202 -0 .094 
2000 0.133 0.247 -0 .115 0.170 0.234 -0 .064 
2001 0.216 0.253 -0 .037 0.260 0.236 0.024 
2002 0.153 0.268 -0 .115 0.181 0.281 -0.100 
2003 0.175 0.270 -0 .095 0.200 0.298 -0 .098 
2004 0.164 0.258 -0.094 0.102 0.270 -0.168 
2005 0.307 0.268 0.038 0.114 0.294 -0.180 
2006 0.263 0.292 -0.028 0.071 0.297 -0 .226 
2007 0.369 0.309 0.060 0.076 0.301 -0.225 
Note: This table summarizes the decomposition of aggregate productivity 
to the unweighted mean of productivity and the covariance of firm produc-
tivity and market shares for the treatment and control groups. Ag~egate 
productivity is calculated using the share of sales in the industry as a weight . 
Panel A lists the absolute levels of productivity, while Panel B lists the 
growth rates relative to the base year 1991. 
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Figure 3·1: Decomposed Productivity Growth for Treatment and 
Control Groups 
TR - Growth Rates 
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Note: This figure draws the growth rates of decomposed aggregate productivity for 
the treatment and control groups. The aggregate productivity (" tfp" ) in each group 
is decomposed into (1 ) the unweighted mean of firm productivity ("unw") and (2) the 
covariance of firm productivity and output market share in the industry (" cov" ). The 
above panel draws the growth rates for the treatment group, while the below panel for 
the control group. Cumulative growth rates are calculated relative to 1991. 
Table 3.8: Productivity Decomposition by Industry and D eregulation Status 
Before Deregula tion After Deregulation 
Productivity Treatment Productivity Treatment 
nic2 Agg. Unw. Cov. S.D. Share N Agg. Unw. Cov. S.D. Share N 
15 -0.557 0.335 -0.892 0.953 0.394 1893 -0.446 0.400 -0.845 0.916 0.391 2363 
16 -0 .531 -0.043 -0.488 0.500 0.173 75 -1.011 -0 .232 -0.780 0.546 0.436 133 
17 0.738 0.133 0.605 0.838 0.422 1695 1.210 0.332 0.878 0.963 0.386 1818 
18 0.193 0.013 0.180 0.441 0.442 224 0.168 0.223 -0.055 0.541 0.484 372 
19 -0.266 1.065 -1.330 0.952 0.735 151 -0.103 1.249 -1.352 0.880 0.756 176 
20 -0.337 -0 .268 -0.069 0.612 0.213 61 -0.522 -0.151 -0.371 0.574 0.308 91 
21 -0.038 0.001 -0.039 0.191 0.451 488 0.069 0.091 -0.021 0.300 0.484 636 
22 0.585 -0.092 0.678 0.656 0.215 172 0.881 0.042 0.839 0.783 0.380 271 
23 0.024 0.093 -0.069 0.476 0.312 141 -0.233 -0.254 0.022 0.497 0.169 172 
24 -0.839 0.244 -1.083 0.793 0.332 3969 -1.071 0.283 -1.354 0.768 0.314 4521 
25 -0 .328 0.237 -0 .566 0.398 0.373 1101 -0.189 0.447 -0.636 0.416 0.370 1403 f-' f-' 
26 -1.068 0.271 -1.339 0.761 0.394 749 -0.848 0.436 -1.284 0.789 0.340 750 0 
27 0.192 0.102 0.089 0.369 0.411 1668 0.047 0.075 -0.028 0.356 0.431 1957 
28 0.825 -0.260 1.085 0.954 0.304 701 1.224 -0.148 1.372 1.073 0.361 927 
29 -0.480 0.182 -0.662 0.566 0.331 1419 -0.216 0.406 -0.622 0.564 0.339 1506 
30 -0.493 0.598 -1.091 1.081 0.523 128 -1.360 0.484 -1.844 1.405 0.449 138 
31 0.279 0.123 0.156 0.354 0.455 723 0.689 0.341 0.348 0.429 0.440 882 
32 0.135 O.Q15 0.119 0.414 0.528 417 0.518 0.218 0.300 0.501 0.488 520 
33 0.575 -0.316 0.891 0.919 0.446 166 0.911 0.017 0.893 0.900 0.483 261 
34 -0.374 0.096 -0.470 0.279 0.520 804 -0.267 0.230 -0 .497 0.340 0.539 1162 
35 -0.328 0.708 -1.036 0.982 0.813 123 -0.895 0.817 -1.712 1.196 0.706 136 
36 0.252 -0 .034 0.286 0.456 0.201 204 2.105 0.279 1.826 1.063 0.155 373 
Total 0.825 1.065 1.085 0.720 0.389 17072 2.105 1.249 1.826 0.754 0.387 20568 
N ote: This table summarizes the decomposition of aggregate productivity to the unweighted mean of productivity and 
the covariance of firm productivity and market shares for the 2-digit industries before and after the 1999 deregulation. 
Aggregate productivity is calculated using the share of sales in the industry as a weight . 
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Table 3.9: DID Effect on TFP index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS FE 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Repeal -0.0120 -0.0119 -0.0482 0.0027 
(0.0214) (0.0198) (0.0458) (0.0218) 
Repeal * Enter after 1991 0.0682 
(0.0453) 
Enter after 1991 0.2546*** 0.2185*** 
(0.0399) (0.0612) 
0 bservations 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 
R-squared 0.0137 0.0379 0.0459 0.8088 
Panel B: Sample of Firms Existing in 1991 
Repeal -0.0482 -0.0540* -0.0470 -0.0374 
(0.0460) (0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0281) 
Repeal * Productivity index in 1991 0.0711 
(0.0527) 
Productivity index in 1991 0.8454*** 1.1487*** 
(0.0245) (0.0240) 
0 bservations 15,115 15,115 15,115 15,115 
R-squared 0.0187 0.5359 0.5451 0.8149 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregula-
tion effect on firm productivity. Besides its interaction terms with the Repeal 
variable in Panel B, the firm productivity in 1991, its interactions with year 
and states dummies are included as additional regressors , respectively. All the 
relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the in-
teractions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** 
p<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * p<O.l. 
(5) 
FE 
-0.0374 
(0.0288) 
0.0754*** 
(0.0268) 
37,640 
0.8089 
-0.0281 
(0.0309) 
0.0445 
(0 .0527) 
15,115 
0.8197 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Table 3.10: DID Effect on TFP index of Firms Located in Mega 
Cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS FE 
Panel A: Sample of Firms Located in Mega Cities 
Repeal -0.0327 -0.0389* -0.1309*** -0.0248* 
(0.0274) (0.0231) (0.0007) (0.0152) 
Repeal * Enter after 1991 0.1532*** 
(0.0022) 
Enter after 1991 0.3092** 0.3242*** 
(0.0618) (0.0298) 
0 bservations 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
R-squared 0.0115 0.0433 0.0472 0.8143 
Panel B: Sample of Firms Located in Mega Cities and Existing in 1991 
Repeal -0.1309*** -0.0909*** -0.0717*** -0.0740*** 
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0176) 
Repeal* 
Productivity index in 1991 0.2040*** 
(0.0314) 
Productivity index in 1991 0.8595*** 0.8934*** 
(0.0399) (0.0124) 
Observations 8,678 8,678 8,678 8,678 
R-squared 0.0034 0.5357 0.5448 0.8140 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregula-
tion effect on firm productivity. Besides its interaction terms with the Repeal 
variable in Panel B, the firm productivity in 1991, its interactions with year 
and states dummies are included as additional regressors, respectively. All the 
relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the in-
teractions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** 
p < O.Ol, ** p < 0.05 , * p<O.l. 
(5) 
FE 
-0.0740*** 
(0.0170) 
0.0912*** 
(0 .0083) 
20,518 
0.8146 
-0.0651 *** 
(0.0151) 
0.1706*** 
(0.0186) 
8,678 
0.8186 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneous Effects on Productivity by Regulation 
Intensity 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
Panel A: Sub-Sample of Firms Located in Cities with a Ceiling of 500m 
Repeal -0.0717*** -0.0734*** -0.0686*** -0.0651 *** 
(0.0151) 
0.1706*** 
(0 .0186) 
(0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0119) 
Repeal* Productivity in 1991 0.2040*** 0.1980*** 0.1426*** 
Observations 
R2 
(0.0314) (0.0280) (0 .0335) 
8,678 
0.5448 
8,678 
0.5670 
8,678 
0.5926 
8,678 
0.8186 
Panel B: Sub-Sample of Firms Located in Cities with a Lower Ceiling than l000m2 
Repeal -0.0302 -0.0304 -0.0327 -0.0370 
(0 .0519) (0.0517) (0 .0511) (0.0533) 
Repeal * Productivity 0.1055 0.1039 0.1228** 0.1123** 
Observations 
R2 
(0.0673) (0.0681) (0.0531) (0.0482) 
11 ,728 
0.5359 
11,728 
0.5594 
11 ,728 
0.5812 
11 ,728 
0.8201 
Panel C: Sub-Sample of Firms Located in Mega, Large or Medium-Sized Cities 
Repeal -0.0278 -0.0268 -0.0323 -0.0117 
(0.0337) (0.0347) (0.0312) (0.0345) 
Repeal * Productivity in 1991 0.0818 0.0785 0.0739* 0.0547 
(0.0527) (0.0518) (0 .0442) (0.0530) 
Observations 13,805 13,805 13,805 13,805 
R2 0.5405 0.5624 0.5837 0.8191 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No 
Time-Varying Industry Effect No No Yes No 
(5) 
FE 
-0.0913*** 
(0.0254) 
0.1155*** 
(0.0236) 
8,678 
0.8375 
-0.0512 
(0.0566) 
0.1166*** 
(0.0407) 
11 ,728 
0.8356 
-0.0210 
(0.0376) 
0.0467 
(0.0483) 
13,805 
0.8348 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregu-
lation effect on firm productivity. Different panels of this table uses different 
intensity of the land regulation. Panel A includes firms in A-cities (mega cities) 
only, Panel B includes A- and B-cities, and Panel C includes A-, B-, and C-cities. 
All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of 
the interactions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. 
*** p<O.Ol , ** p < 0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Table 3.12: DID Effect on Sales Share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS FE FE 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Repeal -0.0242** -0.0243*** -0.0036 -0.0223*** -0 .0488*** 
(0.0100) (0.0071) (0.0134) (0.0079) (0.0152) 
Repeal * Enter after 1991 0.0078 0.0427*** 
(0.0146) (0.0148) 
Enter after 1991 -0 .1459*** -0.1493*** 
(0.0264) (0.0189) 
Observations 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 
R-squared 0.0114 0.0446 0.0551 0.9339 0.9344 
Panel B: Sample of Firms Existing in 1991 
Repeal -0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0128 -0.0488*** -0.0519*** 
(0.0134) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0149) 
Repeal * 
Productivity index in 1991 0.0291 
(0.0314) 
Productivity index in 1991 -0 .1892*** -0.3309*** 
(0.0507) (0.0202) 
0 bservations 15,115 15 ,115 15,115 15 ,115 
R-squared 0.0230 0.0726 0.1091 0.9310 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregula-
t ion effect on sales shares within the treatment and control groups. Besides its 
interaction terms with the Repeal variable in Panel B, the firm productivity in 
1991, its interactions with year and states dummies are included as additional re-
gressors, respectively. All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the 
main regressors of the interactions are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
(0.0141) 
0.0637** 
(0.0255) 
15 ,115 
0.9324 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Table 3.13: DID Effect on Sales Share of Firms Located in Mega 
Cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS OLS FE FE 
Panel A: Sample of Firms Located in Mega Cities 
Repeal -0.0392*** -0.0359*** 0.0265*** .-0.0054 -0.0334*** 
(0.0044) (0.0012) (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0119) 
Repeal * Enter after 1991 -0.0175** 0.0403*** 
(0.0080) (0.0098) 
Enter after 1991 -0.1682*** -0.3201 *** 
(0.0437) (0.0042) 
Observations 20 ,518 20,518 20 ,518 20 ,518 20,518 
R-squared 0.0086 0.0431 0.0515 0.9293 0.9296 
Panel B: Sample of Firms Located in Mega Cities and Existing in 1991 
Repeal 0.0265*** O.Ql77* -0.0062 -0.0334*** -0.0325*** 
(0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0122) (0.0114) 
Repeal 
* Productivity index in 1991 0.0783*** 0.0695*** 
(0.0175) 
Productivity index in 1991 -0.1882** -0.6139*** 
(0.0742) (0.0224) 
Observations 8,678 8,678 8,678 8,678 
R-squared 0.0177 0.0573 0.0808 0.9320 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregula-
tion effect on firm productivity. Besides its interaction terms with the Repeal 
variable in Panel B, the firm productivity in 1991, its interactions with year 
and states dummies are included as additional regressors , respectively. All the 
relevant interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the in-
teractions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** 
p < 0.01 , ** p< 0.05 , * p<O.l. 
(0. 0093) 
8,678 
0.9330 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Table 3.14: The I m pacts on T F P index: Market Competition 
Mechanism 
Sample Full Sample Firms in Mega Cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Repeal 0.0326 0.0140 0.0835*** 0.0297*** 
(0.0331) (0.0288) (0.0139) (0.0111) 
Repeal * 2-digit 
Herfindahl Index -0.4600 -1.4271 *** 
(0.4277) (0.0227) 
Repeal * 3-digit 
Herfindahl Index -0.1024 -0.4864*** 
(0.2148) (0 .0399) 
2-digit Herfindahl Index 0.1016 0.1789*** 
(0.2364) (0.0757) 
3-digit Herfindahl Index -0.1612 -0.0421 
(0.1262) (0.1270) 
Observations 37,640 37,640 20,518 20,518 
R-squared 0.8089 0.8088 0.8151 0.8146 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregula-
tion effect on firm productivity. First two columns use full sample of firms, while 
the next two columns use the sample of firms located in mega cities. Dependent 
variable is firms ' TFP index. Herfindahl index is sum of squares of sales share 
of firms within each industry at designated level in a given year. All specifica-
tions control for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
state-level. *** p< O.Ol , ** p< 0.05 , * p<O.l. 
Table 3.15: The Impacts on Active Firms and on Entry: Market Competition Mechanism 
Dependent Var. Log Number of Entry in 3-digit Industry Log Number of Firms in 3-digit Industry 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Repeal 0.2248* 0.2449** 0.2992** 0.2988** 0.2283** 0.1910*** 0.1858** 0.1818** 
(0 .0948) (0 .0655) (0.0743) (0.0753) (0.0412) (0.0272) (0.0371) (0.0379) 
Repeal * Industry Mean Productivity 0.0045 0.0074 0.0984** 0.0865* 
(0 .0188) (0.0116) (0.0221) (0.0354) 
Repeal * High Concentration -0 .2107** -0.2115** 0.0442 0.0322 
(0.0474) (0 .0471) (0 .0318) (0 .0418) 
Repeal * High Concentration 
* Industry Mean Productivity 0.0018 0.0356 
(0.0050) (0 .0475) 
High Concentration 9.5442** 9.5642** 4.4263 4.6409 
(2.9810) (2 .9877) (2.9316) (2.6747) 
Observations 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 
R-squared 0.8511 0.8578 0.8582 0.8582 0.9839 0.9860 0.9857 0.9860 
State FE * 3-digit Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE * 3-digit Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of difference-in-differences regression where the log number of entry and 
active firms at the 3-digit industry level are regressed on Repeal and other industry level characteristics. Industry 
mean productivity is calculated at the 2-digit industry level at the base year. High concentration is a dummy variable 
of whether a 3-digit industry is above 75 percentile of the distribution of Herfindahl index. Estimation is based on 
observations of state-industry-year cells, at which dependent variables are aggregated. State-industry fixed effects 
and Year-industry fixed effects are controlled for in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. 
*** p < O.Ol, ** p< 0.05, * p<O.l. 
....... 
....... 
--.1 
Table 3.16: Heterogeneous Effects on O utp ut and Capital by I ndustry Average of Real Estate 
Ratio [Mega Cities] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Dependent Var. - Log Sales 
Repeal 0.2749*** 2.5206*** 2.2287** 0.2580*** 2.1618*** 1.9792*** 0.2332*** 1.2107*** 
(0.0855) (0.4590) (0.4062) (0.1023) (0.2264) (0.2683) (0.0323) (0.1755) 
Repeal * A vg. Real Estate Share -5.3707*** -4.7158*** -4.5496*** -4.1643*** -2.3035*** 
(1.3002) (1.1695) (0.7044) (0. 7858) (0.3521) 
A vg. Real Estate Share 0.7991 2.0484 1.6780 -0.7541 0.1623 0.7655 -0.9260* -0.5228*** 
(2.1091) (1.5321) (1.3986) (1.0304) (1.1370) (0.8424) (0.5187) (0.1992) 
Avg. Log Capital 0.6717*** 0.9240*** 
(0 .0274) (0.0344) 
Observations 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
R z 0.0139 0.0178 0.0326 0.0608 0.0634 0.0670 0.8869 0.8872 
Panel B: Dependent Var. =Log Capital 
Repeal 0.0717 1.6323*** 1.1852*** 0.0710 1.3639*** 1.1503*** 0.0875** 0.4145*** 
""""' (0.0861) (0.1590) (0.0518) (0.0920) (0.1209) (0.1905) (0.0414) (0.0961) """"' 00 
Repeal * A vg. Real Estate Ratio -3.7324*** -2. 7292*** -3 .0897*** -2.6388*** -0.7708*** 
(0.5619) (0.2625) (0.4392) (0.5698) (0.1309) 
A vg. Real Estate Ratio 0.1374 1.0055 0.4382 -0.6560 -0.0337 0.6721 -0.8872*** -0.7523** 
(1.2580) (0 .6652) (0.4056) (1.2652) (1.5393) (1.2516) (0.2460) (0.3541) 
Avg. Capital 1.0289*** 1.0812*** 
(0.1466) (0.1292) 
Observations 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
Rz 0.0244 0.0268 0.0715 0.0667 0.0683 0.0746 0.9665 0.9665 
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on firm output and capital for the sample of firms in mega 
cities. Panel A uses log output as a dependent variable, while Panel B uses log capital. Industy average of the real-estate ra tio and the capital is 
calculated as a mean of firm real-estate ratio and capital by 2-digit industries for each year . All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients 
on the main regressors of the interactions are included . Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<O.l. 
Table 3.17: Heterogeneous Effects on TFP Index by Industry Share of Real Estate Capital 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Pull Sample 
Repeal -0.0101 -0.0623 -0.0753 0.0014 0.1331 0.1391 0.0041 0.0934 
(0.0207) (0.1413) (0.1321) (0.0222) (0.1163) (0.1254) (0 .0213) (0.1471) 
Repeal * Avg. Real Estate Share 0.1217 0.1529 -0.3072 -0.3211 -0.2059 
(0.3317) (0.3135) (0.2735) (0.2941) (0.3590) 
Avg. Real Estate Share 1.6333*** 1.6001 *** 1.5618*** 1.1792*** 1.2638*** 1.2432*** 0.9538*** 1.0059** 
(0.2142) (0.2167) (0.2134) (0.2010) (0.1605) (0.1805) (0.3502) (0.4025) 
Avg. Log Capital 0.0877** -0.0360 
(0.0392) (0.0698) 
Observations 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 37,640 
R2 0.0219 0.0219 0.0231 0.0707 0.0708 0.0708 0.8092 0.8093 
Panel B : Sub-Sample of Firms in Mega Cities 
Repeal -0.0213 0.0157 0.0052 -0.0003 0.1375 0.1359* -0.0195* -0.0418 
(0.0262) (0.0670) (0.0754) (0.0328) (0.0939) (0.0724) (0.0110) (0.1104) 
Repeal * A vg. Real Estate Share -0.0885 -0.0649 -0.3291 -0.3258* 0.0525 ...... 
...... 
(0.1841) (0.2113) (0 .2254) (0.1877) (0.2855) <;0 
Avg. Real Estate Share 1.2047*** 1.2253*** 1.2119*** 0.9825*** 1.0488*** 1.0540*** 0.8259 0.8167 
(0.2004) (0.2279) (0.2423) (0.2752) (0.2522) (0.3241) (0.6409) (0.6889) 
A vg. Log Capital 0.0242 0.0079 
(0 0328) (0.1131) 
Observations 20,518 20,518 20 ,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
R2 0.0156 0.0156 0.0157 0.0599 0.0599 0.0599 0.8147 0.8147 
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Time-Varying Industry Effect No No No No No No No No 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on firm productivity for the full sample and the sample 
of firms in mega cities. Panel A uses the full sample, while Panel B uses the sample of firms in mega cities. Industy average of the real-estate 
ratio and the capital is calculated as a mean of firm real-estate ratio and capital by 2-digit industries for each year. All the relevant interactions 
to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the interactions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < O.l. 
Table 3.18: Heterogeneous Effects on Real Estate and Machinery by Industry Average of Real 
Estate Ratio [Mega Cities] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A : Dependent Var = Plant and Machinery 
Repeal 0.1541 1.6204*** 1.1746*** 0.1587 1.4055*** 1.2027** 0.1184 0.7222** 
(0.0825) (0.2573) (0 .1335) (0.0907) (0.1399) (0.2132) (0 .0530) (0.1584) 
Repeal * Real Estate Ratio -3 .5068** -2.5064** -2.9798** -2.5516** -1.4229** 
(0.8109) (0.5162) (0.5215) (0.6509) (0.2482) 
Real Estate Ratio -1.6228 -0.8072 -1.3729 -2.2027 -1.6025 -0.9322 -1.5393*** -1.2902** 
(1.3171) (0.9569) (0.7004) (1.0934) (1.2539) (0.9948) (0.0936) (0.3665) 
A vg. Capital 1.0260*** 1.0268*** 
(0 .1393) (0.1470) 
Observations 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
R2 0.0288 0.0310 0.0774 0.0735 0.0750 0.0809 0.9485 0.9487 
Panel B: Dependent Var =Real Estate {Land and Building) 
Repeal -0.0519 1.1027*** 0.7074*** -0.0582 0.8238*** 0.6452** 0.0314 0.1495** 
(0.0777) (0.1492) (0.0790) (0.0826) (0.1399) (0.1928) (0.0296) (0.0366) 
Repeal * Real Estate Ratio -2. 7612** -1.8741 *** -2.1077** -1. 7307* -0.2784*** 
(0.4816) (0.2252) (0.4639) (0.5647) (0.0258) 
Real Estate Ratio 2.3209 2.9632** 2.4615*** 1.5895 2.0140 2.6042 -0.0047 0.0441 
(1.0327) (0.5677) (0.3498) (1.3737) (1.5823) (1.3317) (0.3552) (0.3736) 
A vg. Capital 0.9099*** 0.9041 *** 
(0.1411) (0.0931) 
Observations 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 20,518 
R2 0.0320 0.0333 0.0689 0.0671 0.0679 0.0723 0.9754 0.9754 
Firm FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on capital inputs for the sample of firms in mega cities. 
Panel A uses plant and machinery as the dependent variable, while Panel B uses real estate. Industy average of the real-estate ratio and the capital 
is calculated as a mean of firm real-estate ratio and capital by 2-digit industries for each year. All the relevant interactions to estimate coefficients 
on the main regressors of the interactions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** p < O.Ol, ** p < 0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Table 3.19: Heterogeneous Effects on Real Estate and Machinery by Real Estate Ratio at Firm 
& Industry Level [Mega Cities] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A : Dependent Var. = Plant and Machinery 
Repeal 0.8267*** 1.6695** 1.9863*** 0.8652*** 2.0296*** 1.9643*** 2.9185*** 
(0.0522) (0. 7698) (0.7354) (0.0589) (0.0700) (0.0704) (0.0138) 
Repeal * Industry RE Ratio -1. 7093*** -3.9623** -4.6297*** -1.9184*** -5.0756*** -4.9377*** -7.4676*** 
(0.2811) (1.8411) (1. 7599) (0.0140) (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0465) 
Repeal * Firm RE Ratio -2.0068*** 0.4079*** 0.0814 
(0.2565) (0.0041) (0.1627) 
Industry RE Ratio -3.4458*** -2.5847 -2.5855 
(0.2631) (1.7776) (1.7693) 
Firm RE Ratio -1.6200*** -1.5297*** 
(0.3594) (0.2577) 
Observations 20,518 8,050 8,050 20,518 8 ,050 8,050 8,050 
R2 0.0395 0.0552 0.0578 0.9483 0.9458 0.9459 0.9473 
Panel B : Dependent Var. =Real Estate (Land and Building) 
Repeal 0.1672 0.4755 0.8336 0. 1985*** 0.7907*** 0.8303*** 1.1141 *** 
(0.1758) (0.7549) (0.7512) (0.0355) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0363) 
Repeal * Indust ry RE Ratio -0.6271 ** -1.0716 -1.8262 -0.4350*** -2.0380*** -2. 1218*** -2.9581 *** 
(0.2563) (1.8682) (1.8521) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0635) 
Repeal * Firm RE Ratio -2.2685*** -0.2476*** 0.0897 
(0.1548) (0.0002) (0.1311) 
Industry RE Ratio -1.4174 *** 0.6774 0.6765 
(0.2694) (1.8653) (1.8556) 
Firm RE Ratio 1. 7916*** 1.8937*** 
(0.2768) (0.1534) 
Observations 20,518 8,050 8,050 20,518 8,050 8,050 8,050 
R2 0.0295 0.0680 0.0711 0.9754 0.9759 0.9759 0.9765 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Absolute Values of Firm RE ratio No No No No No No Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on capital inputs for the sample of firms in mega cities. 
Panel A uses the full sample, while Panel B uses the sample of firms in mega cities. Industy average of the real-estate ratio and the capital is 
calculated as a mean of firm real-estate ratio and capital by 2-d igit industries of the base year. Firm real-estate ratio is the base year's value. 
Column (1) and (4) use the sample of firms throughout the period, while the other columns use the firms existing in the base year. All the relevant 
interactions to estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the interact ions are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. *** 
p<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * p<O.l. 
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Table 3.20: Heterogeneous Effects of Land D eregulation on Real-Estate Ratio in Mega Cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Repeal -0.1270** -0.3015*** -0.2866*** -0.1936*** -0.2712*** -0.2411 *** -0.3877*** 
(0.0292) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0082) 
Repeal * Industry RE ratio 0.1775 0.7236*** 0.6921 *** 0.4436*** 0.6509*** 0.5872*** 0.9679*** 
(0.0785) (0.0031) (O.D108) (0 .0015) (0 .0012) (0.0008) (0.0321) 
Repeal * Firm RE ratio -0.0945* -0.1883*** -0.0100 
(0.0279) (0 .0010) (0 .0276) 
Industry RE ratio 0.4266** 0.7231 *** 0.7231 *** 
(0 .0791) (0.0104) (0.0102) 
Firm RE ratio 0.8305*** 0.8348*** 
(0.0236) (0.0279) 
Observations 20,514 8,050 8,050 20,514 8,050 8,050 8,050 f-' tv R2 0.0483 0.7168 0.7171 0.9008 0.8637 0.8645 0.8740 tv 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Absolute Values of Firm RE ratio No No No No No No Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect on the real-estate ratio 
for the sample of firms in mega cities. Industy average of the real-estate ratio and the capital is calculated as 
a mean of firm real-estate ratio and capital by 2-digit industries of the base year. Firm real-estate ratio is the 
base year's values de-meaned by the industry-average. Column (1) and ( 4) use the sample of firms throughout 
the period, while the other columns use the firms existing in the base year. All the relevant interactions to 
estimate coefficients on the main regressors of the interactions are included . Standard errors are clustered at 
the state-level. *** p<0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p<O.l. 
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Table 3.21: Heterogeneous Effects by Firm Real-Estate Ratio in 
Mega Cities 
RE Ratio Plant & Machinery Real Estate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Repeal -0.0249*** -0.0353*** 0.1125 0.1920*** 0.0229 0.0313*** 
(0.0074) (0.0033) (0 .0830) (0.0223) (0.0431) (0 .0071) 
Repeal * Firm RE Ratio 0.0254 -0.1944 -0.0206 
(0.0261) (0.1495) (0.1229) 
Observations 8,050 8,050 8,050 8,050 8 ,050 8,050 
R z 0.8729 0.8729 0.9460 0.9461 0.9762 0.9762 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: This table shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the deregulation effect 
on the real-estate ratio for the sample of firms existing in the base year in mega cities. 
Firm real-estate ratio is the base year's value. All the relevant interactions to estimate 
coefficients on the main regressors of the interactions are included. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state-level. *** p<O.Ol , ** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
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